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FALLING THROUGH THE CRACKS: THE
SHORTCOMINGS OF VICTIM AND WITNESS
PROTECTION UNDER § 1512 OF THE FEDERAL
VICTIM AND WITNESS PROTECTION ACT
I. INTRODUCTION
In the complicated world of criminal law, federal, state, and local
officials must often cooperate to ensure proper investigation and
potential prosecution of federal crimes.1 Local authorities often rely on
federal agencies to provide assistance during investigations of the
commission of federal crimes.2 Essential to these investigations and
prosecutions is the cooperation of victims and witnesses.3 In turn,
victims and witnesses of federal crimes are entitled to be adequately
protected throughout the entire process.4 Congress enacted the federal
Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982 (“VWPA”) to better ensure
such protection.5 However, many victims continue to fall through the
cracks and are not adequately protected against intimidation and witness
tampering. This is especially true when a person is a victim or a witness
of a federal crime that initially is reported to local officials, upon which
federal authorities eventually investigate. In such a scenario, United
States Courts of Appeals disagree as to whether victims and witnesses
are covered under the VWPA.6
To illustrate, consider Mark Sponslor, a family man with a wife and
two children.7 One morning, while walking to the bus stop, he witnesses
two men acting suspiciously. Before the two men become aware that
Mark is approaching the bus stop, one removes a firearm and shoots the
other, making Mark a witness of a violent crime involving a firearm. The
perpetrator flees the scene before local police arrive. Mark cooperates
fully with the officials and agrees to assist them in the future if needed.
1
Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-291, 96 Stat. 1248 (Oct. 12,
1982) [“VWPA”]. See also President’s Task Force on Victims of Crime: Final Report 114,
(1982), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/ovc/publications/presdntstskforcrprt/
87299.pdf [hereinafter President’s Task Force].
2
Brendan Kearney, Federal Appeals Court Affirms Witness Intimidation Convictions, DAILY
REC., Aug. 23, 2007.
3
S. Rep. No. 97-532, at 9 (1982), as reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2515-16. See also
VWPA, supra note 1.
4
Federal Bureau of Investigation, Victim Assistance: Rights of Federal Crime Victims,
http://www.fbi.gov/hq/cid/victimassist/crimevictims.htm (last visited Aug. 26, 2008).
See also S. Rep. No. 97-532, supra note 3; President’s Task Force, supra note 1, at 11.
5
18 U.S.C. § 1512 (2006). See also VWPA, supra note 1; S. Rep. No. 97-532, supra note 3.
6
See infra Part III (analyzing the interpretation of § 1512 to preclude protection in some
cases where state and local authorities initiate the investigation).
7
The hypothetical is the contribution of the author of this Note.
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During the initial investigation, local police discover evidence linking the
shooting to gang facilitated drug trafficking—a larger epidemic in the
area. Investigators are able to identify the victim of the shooting as a
prominent member in a gang known for distributing drugs throughout
the area. The victim is unconscious, and police are therefore unable to
question him regarding the shooting. However, other evidence points to
another prominent gang member, Max Rissen, and police recover
evidence suggesting that the shooting was possibly related to drug
activity. Local investigators begin to anticipate the need to request
federal assistance in the matter and contact federal officials in
anticipation of such need.
Meanwhile, local investigators contact Mark to request that he help
them identify the perpetrator of the shooting at a police lineup later that
week. Before local police are able to detain Max, Max discovers the
identity of Mark and firebombs Mark’s house in an effort to prevent
Mark from identifying him as the shooter. This attack occurs before
federal officials become officially involved in investigating the shooting.
A short time later, federal authorities begin to investigate the shooting
and related drug activity. Local and federal investigators are able to
determine, through a joint investigation, that drugs were a major cause
of the shooting. Also, federal officials discover that Max is a convicted
felon, making his possession of a firearm a federal offense. Mark
continues to communicate with local authorities throughout the entire
joint investigation. Based significantly on Mark’s testimony, the federal
prosecutor then takes the case to a grand jury. Max is later convicted of
possession of a firearm by a convicted felon and several federal drug
crimes.8 The prosecutor decides to also charge Max with witness
intimidation under § 1512 of the VWPA.9
The proper test to determine when to provide protection to victims
and witnesses of federal crimes is whether a sufficient federal nexus
exists.10 This hypothetical illustrates the situation that led to the circuit
8
See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 841 (2006) (proscribing certain drug related offenses); 18 U.S.C.
§ 844 (2006) (proscribing simple possession of a controlled substance); 18 U.S.C. § 846
(2006) (proscribing conspiracy to commit drug crimes); 18 U.S.C. § 931 (2006) (proscribing
possession of a firearm by a convicted felon).
9
See infra Part II.B (discussing why the scope of the VWPA includes such acts as the
firebombing of Mark’s house). Many states have also adopted statutes which provide for
victim and witness protection and some have passed amendments to their constitutions
providing for victims’ rights. Richard Barajas & Scott Alexander Nelson, The Proposed
Crime Victims’ Federal Constitutional Amendment: Working Toward a Proper Balance, 49 BAYLOR
L. REV. 1 (1997); Davya B. Gewurz & Maria A. Mercurio, The Victims’ Bill of Rights: Are
Victims all Dressed UP With No Place to Go?, 8 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 251, 267 (1992).
10
See infra Part III (analyzing the current confusion surrounding the federal nexus
requirement of the Act).
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split regarding whether such a nexus exists. While Congress may have
enacted the VWPA to ensure protection for people like Mark, some
courts would conclude that Mark is not entitled to protection under the
Act.11 Those same courts would find that a sufficient federal nexus to
bring Mark under the protection of the Act did not exist at the time when
the perpetrator attacked and threatened Mark in order to prevent his
further cooperation with the authorities investigating the crime, because
the acts of intimidation occurred prior to the determination that federal
crimes were involved.12 However, other courts would find a federal
nexus and convict the defendant for witness intimidation under the Act
because federal crimes were involved and information shared by Mark
with local authorities was likely to be communicated to a federal
officer.13
This lack of uniformity among the circuits indicates the need for an
amendment to § 1512 of the VWPA which provides for: (1) protection of
witnesses and victims whose information regarding the commission of a
federal crime was transferred to federal officers, and (2) a balancing of
factors in determining what constitutes a sufficient nexus so as to supply
protection to victims of most federal crimes regardless of the authorities
to whom those victims initially reported the crime.14
The purpose of this Note is to advocate an amendment to § 1512 of
the VWPA in order to comport with the stated intent of Congress to
ensure integrity throughout the entire criminal justice process and
provide adequate protection to victims and witnesses of federal crimes.15
Part II discusses the history of the VWPA and the different approaches
used by courts to determine what constitutes a sufficient federal nexus.16
Specifically, Part II discusses the scope of § 1512 of the Act as it pertains
to the intent and jurisdictional elements of § 1512 and the current circuit
split regarding the federal nexus requirement of the Act.17 Next, Part III
discusses the inefficiency of approaches by circuit courts today to
determine whether a defendant may be prosecuted under § 1512.18
See infra Part II.D (discussing decisions of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals
regarding § 1512 of the VWPA).
12
See infra Part II.D.
13
See infra Part II.D (discussing decisions of the Eleventh and Fourth Circuits Courts of
Appeals regarding the federal nexus requirement of § 1512).
14
See infra Part IV (proposing an amendment to § 1512 of the VWPA).
15
See infra Part IV (proposing an amendment to § 1512 of the VWPA). See also infra notes
29–31 and accompanying text (discussing the legislative purpose behind the enactment of
the VWPA).
16
See infra Part II.A (discussing the history of the VWPA).
17
See infra Part II.
18
See infra Part III (analyzing the current problems associated with the differing
interpretations of the federal nexus requirement of § 1512).
11
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Finally, Part IV proposes an amendment to the current statute that
comports more fully with the intent of the statute.19
II. BACKGROUND: WITNESS PROTECTION UNDER § 1512 OF THE FEDERAL
VICTIM AND WITNESS PROTECTION ACT
Congress enacted the VWPA to broaden protection provided to
victims and witnesses of federal crimes.20
Initially, due to the
restructuring and revision of earlier witness protection statutes because
of the passage of the VWPA, courts disagreed about the scope of § 1512
of the Act in relation to the former statutes.21 Once the courts
determined the scope of § 1512, the focus shifted to interpreting specific
elements within the Section.22 Part II.A first discusses the history of the
VWPA.23 Part II.B then discusses the scope of § 1512 of the VWPA in
relation to the former witness protection statute.24 Part II.C discusses the
intent and jurisdictional elements of § 1512.25 Finally, Part II.D discusses
the current circuit split regarding the VWPA’s federal nexus
requirement.26
A. Restructuring and Expanding the Protection of Federal Victims and
Witnesses
During a period of increasing public awareness of victims’ rights,
brought forth by the “Victims’ Rights Movement,”27 Congress enacted
See infra Part IV.
See infra Part II.A (discussing the purpose of § 1512).
21
See infra Part II.B (discussing the scope of § 1512 in relation to § 1503).
22
See infra Part II.C (discussing the intent and jurisdictional elements of § 1512).
23
See infra Part II.A.
24
See infra Part II.B.
25
See infra Part II.C.
26
See infra Part II.D.
27
See generally VWPA, supra note 1 (noting national awareness of the plight of victims’
and the need for legislation to provide protection for these victims); President’s Task Force,
supra note 1, at 5 (reporting on victim disillusionment with the criminal justice system);
ABA Criminal Justice Section, Reducing Victim/Witness Intimidation: A Package 1 (1981)
(proposing a model statute protecting victims’ rights in criminal proceedings); Barajas &
Alexander Nelson, supra note 9 (discussing the historical role of victims and victims’ rights
amendments to state constitutions); Andrew J. Karmen, Who’s Against Victims’ Right? The
Nature of the Opposition to Pro-Victim Initiatives in Criminal Justice, 8 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL
COMMENT. 157 (1992); Karyn Ellen Polito, The Rights of Crime Victims in the Criminal Justice
System: Is Justice Blind to the Victims of Crime?, 16 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV.
CONFINEMENT 241 (1990) (discussing the rights of victims in criminal investigations and
proceedings); Steven D. Walker, History of the Victims’ Movement in the United States,
http://aabss.org/journal2000/f04Walker.jmm.html (last visited Aug. 26, 2008) (discussing
the emergence of the Victims’ Movement in the United States); Marlene A. Young, The
Victims Movement: A Confluence of Forces, National Symposium on Victims of Federal
19
20
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the VWPA of 1982.28 In response to findings indicating that victims and
witnesses of federal crimes were not afforded proper protection under
then-existing law, Congress passed the VWPA in order to provide better
protection and assistance to victims and witnesses of criminal activity.29
Specifically, recognizing that witness cooperation and participation is
essential to effectiveness of the criminal justice system, Congress added
18 U.S.C § 1512 to then-existing federal witness tampering law, namely
18 U.S.C. § 1503, which broadened the definition of witness tampering
and extended protection to a broader range of persons in order to
safeguard the integrity of the judicial system and encourage witness
participation in all stages of federal investigations and proceedings.30
Crime, http://www.trynova.org/victiminfo/readings/VictimsMovement.pdf (last visited
Jan. 7, 2008) (discussing the development of the victim protection laws).
28
See S. Rep. No. 97-532, supra note 3, at 9 (1982), (noting President Regan’s effort to
bring national attention to victims’ rights). See also Barajas & Nelson, supra note 9, at 2
(discussing how increased public awareness of victims’ rights starting in the 1970s,
President Regan’s focus on victims’ rights in the early 1980s and the formation of national
organizations in support of victims brought about suggestions for a constitutional
amendment protecting victims’ rights in criminal proceedings and discussing state
constitutional amendments passed in twenty-nine states); Gewurz & Mercurio, supra note 9
(discussing the need for a constitutional amendment securing victims’ rights in criminal
proceedings); Jeremy McLaughlin & Joshua M. Nahum, Obstruction of Justice, 44 AM. CRIM.
L. REV. 793, 812 (2007) (noting that Congress enacted the VWPA in response to growing
concerns that the judicial system did not provide sufficient protection to victims and
witnesses of crimes); Teresa Anne Pesce, Defining Witness Tampering Under 18 U.S.C.,
Section 1512, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1417 (1986) (noting that Congress passed the VWPA in
response to growing concerns that previous witness tampering statutes did not provide
sufficient protection to victims).
29
S. Rep. No. 97-532, supra note 3, at 9. See also VWPA, supra note 1. The Senate Report
also recognized that most serious violent crimes fall under state and local jurisdiction. S.
Rep. No. 97-532, supra note 3, at 9. Thus, the purpose of the VWPA is to supplement state
and local laws and provide protection to victims of and witnesses to the commission or
possible commission of federal crimes. Id. One of the main purposes of § 1512, outside of
the desire to provide broader protection to victims and witnesses, is to protect the integrity
of the federal judicial system and any investigations ancillary to that system. Id.
For purposes of the rights and services provided to victims and witness of federal
crimes, the Federal Bureau of Investigation has defined “crime victim” as “a person who
has been directly and proximately harmed (physically, emotionally, or financially) as a
result of the commission of a federal offense . . . .” Federal Bureau of Investigation, Victim
Assistance: Rights of Federal Crime Victims, http://www.fbi.gov/hq/cid/victimassist/
crimevictims.htm (last visited Aug. 26, 2008).
See 18 U.S.C. § 1512 (2006); 18 U.S.C. § 1503. See also VWPA, supra note 1 (noting that
“the Federal government . . . has an important leadership role to assume in ensuring that
victims of crime, whether at the Federal, State, or local level[]” are adequately protected in
order to facilitate the cooperation of the victim in the criminal justice system). The Senate
Report determined that “[w]ithout the cooperation of victims and witnesses, the criminal
justice system would simply cease to function and few criminals, if any, would be brought
to justice.” S. Rep. No. 97-532, supra note 3, at 9. The VWPA also includes additional
provisions providing, among other things, punishment for retaliation against victims,
30
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When first passed, the VWPA came under harsh criticism from
opponents claiming the Act impinged on defendants’ due process
rights.31 However, § 1512 has withstood constitutional attack in federal
Federal courts have held that the statute is not
courts.32
unconstitutionally vague or overbroad and is consistent with the
Necessary and Proper Clause of the United States Constitution.33
Additionally, because the Act provides fair notice to potential
victim restitution, and guidelines for the fair treatment of witnesses in the system.
VWPA, supra note 1
In addition to federal legislative action to broaden protection provided to victims and
witnesses, many states have passed constitutional amendments providing rights to
victims. Barajas & Nelson, supra note 9, at 11; National Organization for Victim
Assistance, Crime Victim & Witness Rights: NOVA Promotion of Crime Victim Rights,
http://www.trynova.org/about/victimrights.html.
Also, many states have passed
legislation to ensure protection to victims and witnesses of crimes. Gewurz & Mercurio,
supra note 9, at 251-252. See also National Center for Victims of Crimes, Victims and Crimes
Included in the Victims’ Rights Laws, http://www.ncvc.org/ncvc/AGP.Net/Components/
documentviewer/Download.aspxnz?DocumentID=32568 (last visited Aug 26, 2008)
(listing various state legislative enactments of victims’ rights laws passed before 1995).
See generally William H. Jeffress, Jr., The New Federal Witness Tampering Statute, 22 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 1, 17 (1984) (arguing that § 1512 is unconstitutional because it is overbroad in
that it may encompass lawful behavior and also arguing that the section impermissibly
shifts the burden of proof to the defendant to prove that he acted lawfully under the
statute); Karmen, supra note 27 (discussing opposition to the Victims’ Rights Movement).
Other commentators suggest that the Victims’ Rights Movement exacerbates class and
racial divisions and ignores an accused person’s right to be presumed innocent. See
Kenneth Henley, The Role of the Victim in Criminal Law, Fla. Int’l U. Faculty Lunchtime
Symposium Presentation, at 2 (Feb. 22, 2001), http://www.fiu.edu/~ippcs/henley.htm.
32
Cheryl Anne Adams, White-Collar Crime: Fourth Survey of Law: Substantive Crimes:
Witness Tampering, 24 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 755, 755-56 (1987). See generally Eric C. Surette,
Annotation, Construction and Application of Federal Witness Tampering Statute, 185 A.L.R. FED.
1 (2003).
33
Many cases have decided that § 1512 is not unconstitutionally vague. United States v.
Tyler, 281 F.3d 84 (3d Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 858 (2002); United States v. Shotts, 145
F.3d 1289, 1300 (11th Cir. 1998), cert denied, 534 U.S. 896 (2001); United States v. Jackson, 986
F.Supp. 829 (S.D.N.Y. 1997), cert denied, 530 U.S. 1267 (2000); United States v. Porter, 977
F.Supp. 679, 682 (M.D. Pa. 1997); United States v. Bergerstock, 1994 WL 449019, 3 (N.D.N.Y.
1994) (holding that § 1512 is not facially vague); United States v. Kalevas, 622 F.Supp. 1523,
1527 (D.C.N.Y. 1985).
Several cases have held that § 1512 is not overbroad. United States v. Thompson, 76
F.3d 442 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding that § 1512 is not unconstitutionally overbroad); United
States v. Bergerstock, 1994 WL 449019, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. 1994) (holding that § 1512 is not
facially overbroad or vague); United States v. Wilson, 565 F.Supp. 1416 (D.C.N.Y. 1983)
(holding that § 1512 is not unconstitutionally overbroad).
Also, the circuits have held that § 1512 does not violate the Necessary and Proper
Clause. United States v. Tyler, 281 F.3d 84 (3d Cir. 2002) (holding that § 1512 does not
violate the Necessary and Proper Clause of the United States Constitution because it is
consistent with Congress’s authority to punish crimes and regulate court procedures);
United States v. Bell, 113 F.3d 1345 (3d Cir. 1997) (holding that § 1512 did not exceed
Congress’ power in violation of the Necessary and Proper Clause).
31
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defendants, in that its plain language sets forth the prohibition of
preventing witnesses from providing information or testifying regarding
federal crimes or in federal proceedings, courts have held that the VWPA
does not violate a defendant’s Fifth Amendment due process rights.34 In
addition to resolving the constitutionality of the Act, courts have
addressed its scope.35
B. Scope of § 1512 of the VWPA
Before the passage of the VWPA, Congress provided for witness
protection primarily through 18 U.S.C. § 1503.36 Section 1503 required a
specific intent to intimidate a person who would actually be a witness in
a pending proceeding.37 Thus, § 1503 provided protection to a small
number of persons involved in investigations and proceedings.38
However, § 1512 was added to VWPA to extend protection to a broader
range of witnesses and prohibit a broader range of actions.39
34
See Tyler, 281 F.3d at 94 (holding that even though “Congress plainly intended to omit
a state-of-mind requirement with regard to the federal connection[,]” the statute is not
unconstitutional because it clearly states the conduct which would fall within the purview
of the statute), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 858 (2002); Shotts, 145 F.3d at1300 (holding that the
word “corrupt” provides adequate notice to defendants of what conduct is prohibited),
cert. denied 525 U.S. 1177 (1998); Kalevas, 622 F.Supp. at 1527 (holding that § 1512 provides
adequate notice to possible defendants because it defines with sufficient clarity conduct
which would constitute intimidation and misleading conduct that would violate the Act)
(citing Wilson, 565 F.Supp. at 1430–31).
35
See infra Part II.B (discussing the scope of § 1512).
36
Pesce, supra note 28, at 1420 (stating that prior to 1982, § 1503 provided the primary
protection for witnesses). See also Tina M. Riley, Tampering with Witness Tampering:
Resolving the Quandary Surrounding 18 U.S.C. §§ 1503, 1512, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 249 (1999)
(stating that prior to 1982, § 1503 was the most frequently invoked statute for prosecution
of witness tampering).
37
18 U.S.C. § 1503 (2006). See also United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593 (1995); infra Part
II.C.2; Pesce, supra note 28, at 1419–20. Prior to 1982, the government had to prove a
defendant acted with the specific intent to influence a witness and that the witness was
actually participating in a pending judicial proceeding. Pesce, supra note 28, at 1419–20.
38
Id. at 1420. In order to be prosecuted under § 1503 prior to 1982, a “defendant must
have sought to influence a person who actually would be, or who the defendant believed
would be, a witness in the pending proceeding.” Id. Currently, § 1503 requires that the
government establish that a defendant “endeavors to influence, intimidate, or impede” a
juror, officer or judge from fulfilling her official obligations at “any examination or other
proceeding . . . .” 18 U.S.C. § 1503(a) (2006). Thus, current witness protection under § 1503
is still limited to persons participating in pending proceedings. Pesce, supra note 28, at
1420.
39
Id. Section 1512 of VWPA protects “any person” who may communicate information
regarding a federal offense even prior to the commencement of an official proceeding. 18
U.S.C. § 1512 (2006). After the enactment of § 1512, Congress revised § 1503 by removing
the term witness from that section. Brain M. Haney, Contrasting the Prosecution of Witness
Tampering Under 18 U.S.C. § 1503 and 18 U.S.C. § 1512: Why § 1512 Better Serves the
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The witness tampering provisions of § 1512 of the VWPA set forth
punishment for anyone who knowingly attempts—through murder,
attempted murder, physical force, threat of physical force, or through
intimidation—to prevent any person from communicating or providing
information relating to the commission or possible commission of a
federal crime to a law enforcement officer.40 The government establishes
Government at Trial, 9 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP. ADVOC. 57, 63 (2004). Congress left § 1503’s
residual omnibus intact, however, which initially caused courts to grapple with the exact
scope of the newly enacted § 1512. Pesce, supra note 28, at 1422–23.
Congress enacted VWPA to “clarify ambiguities and cure deficiencies” of witness
protection under § 1503. Id. at 1418. See also Haney, supra note 39, at 63 (discussing § 1503’s
limitations as a method to adequately prosecute defendants accused of witness tampering);
McLaughlin & Nahum, supra note 28, at 810 (noting that Congress enacted VWPA to
provide better protection than that provided under § 1503 prior to 1982).
40
18 U.S.C. § 1512 (2006). The statute states:
(a)(1) Whoever kills or attempts to kill another person, with intent to— . . .
(C) prevent the communication by any person to a law
enforcement officer or judge of the United States of
information relating to the commission or possible
commission of a Federal offense or a violation of conditions
of probation, parole, or release pending judicial proceedings;
shall be punished as provided in paragraph (3).
(2) Whoever uses physical force or the threat of physical force
against any person, or attempts to do so, with intent to— . . .
(C) hinder, delay, or prevent the communication to a law
enforcement officer or judge of the United States of
information relating to the commission or possible
commission of a Federal offense or a violation of conditions
of probation, supervised release, parole, or release pending
judicial proceedings; shall be punished as provided in
paragraph (3). . .
(b) Whoever knowingly uses intimidation or physical force, threatens,
or corruptly persuades another person, or attempts to do so, or
engages in misleading conduct toward another person, with intent
to— . . .
(3) hinder, delay, or prevent the communication to a law
enforcement officer or judge of the United States of
information relating to the commission or possible
commission of a Federal offense or a violation of conditions
of probation, supervised release [sic], parole, or release
pending judicial proceedings; shall be fined under this title
or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both.
(c) Whoever corruptly—
(1) alters, destroys, mutilates, or conceals a record,
document, or other object, or attempts to do so, with the
intent to impair the object’s integrity or availability for use in
an official proceeding; or
(2) otherwise obstructs, influences, or impedes any official
proceeding, or attempts to do so, shall be fined under this
title or imprisoned . . . .
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intent by proving that the defendant knowingly attempted to use or
threaten to use force with the intent to prevent communication with a
federal officer regarding a federal crime or proceeding, regardless of
whether the defendant specifically knew that the proceeding was federal
in nature or that the officer was a federal agent.41 Also, the government
(d) Whoever intentionally harasses another person and thereby
hinders, delays, prevents, or dissuades any person from —. . .
(2) reporting to a law enforcement officer or judge of the
United States the commission or possible commission of a
Federal offense or a violation of conditions of probation
supervised release [sic], parole, or release pending judicial
proceedings; . . .
or attempts to do so, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not
more than 3 years, or both.
18 U.S.C.§§ 1512(a)(1)(C), (a)(2)(C), (b)(3), (c)(1)–(2), (d)(2) (2006).
While debating the passage of this act, Congress recognized that “a criminal case often
involves people who will never testify in open court, but who act as confidential
informants, provide background information, or give hearsay statements.” Haney, supra
note 39, at 62. Congress passed § 1512 of the VWPA with the intent to extend protection to
those people intertwined with the witness function. Id. at 59. The original enactment did
not provide for protection for victims against murder; but in 1986, Congress enacted an
amendment which added killing and attempting killing to prohibited acts used to
intimidate witnesses. Criminal Law and Procedural Technical Amendments Act of 1986,
Pub. L. No. 99-646, 1986 Stat. 1236 (codified as 18 U.S.C § 1512(a)). The 1986 enactment also
added technical amendments. Id.
At the time of publication several proposed amendments § 1512 were pending in
Congress. See S. 1946, 110th Cong (2007); H.R. 3887, 110th Cong. (2007); S. 456, 110th Cong.
(2007); S. 1946, 110th Cong. (2007); S. 378, 110th Cong. (2007); S. 447, 110th Cong. (2007). A
few of the proposed amendments merely make technical or conforming changes to the
language of § 1512 and do not affect the substance of the Act. S. 456, 110th Cong. (2007).
Two proposals would change the sentencing provisions of the Act, increasing the
maximum penalty and striking the death penalty. S. 378, 110th Cong. (2007); S. 447, 110th
Cong. (2007). The Public Corruption Prosecution Act would amend § 1512(i) to state that
any prosecution under the Chapter could be brought in the district in which the act
occurred, instead of simply providing for §§ 1512 and 1503. S. 1946, 110th Cong. (2007).
Finally, William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2007
would provide several provisions related to the disclosure of information regarding a
violation of an employment visa or labor and employment law. H.R. 3887, 110th Cong.
(2007).
41
18 U.S.C. § 1512(g) (2006). The section states:
(g) [i]n a prosecution for an offense under this section, no state of mind
need be proved with respect to the circumstance—
(1) that the official proceeding before a judge . . . or government
agency is before a judge or court of United States . . . or a Federal
Government Agency; or
(2) that the judge is a judge of the United States or that the law
enforcement officer is an officer or employee of the Federal
Government or a person authorized to act for or on the behalf of the
Federal Government or serving the Federal Government as an adviser
or consultant.
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need not show that an official proceeding was pending or that one was
about to be instituted at the time of the attempted intimidation.42
However, the government must prove that the defendant acted with
knowledge that his actions could affect a witness’ communication
regarding a current or future federal proceeding.43
Congress revised former § 1503 by removing the word “witness” in
order to provide a comprehensive scheme for witness protection under
§ 1512.44 However, Congress did not delete § 1503’s omnibus clause,
which provided a general prohibition against obstruction of justice.45
18 U.S.C. § 1512(g) (2006). This language is consistent with Congressional intent to provide
broader protection to victims and witnesses from conduct not protected under § 1503. S.
Rep. No. 97-532, supra note 3, at 9 (stating the purpose of the VWPA “is to strengthen
existing legal protections for victims and witnesses of Federal crimes”). See also United
States v. Veal, 153 F.3d 1233, 1247 (11th Cir. 1998) (discussing legislative intent to “expand
the existing ‘obstruction of justice’ statutory scheme by enacting § 1512[]”).
42
18 U.S.C. § 1512(f) (2006). This section of the Act states: “For purposes of this
section—(1) an official proceeding need not be pending or about to be instated at the time
of the offense; and (2) the testimony, or the record, document, or other object need not be
admissible in evidence or free of a claim of privilege.” 18 U.S.C. § 1512(g) (2006).
43
See 18 U.S.C. § 1512(a)(1)(C) (2006) (stating that a defendant must have acted with the
intent to “prevent the communication by any person” to federal law enforcement or judges
regarding a federal crime); 18 U.S.C. § 1512(a)(2)(C) (2006) (stating a defendant must act
with the intent to “hinder, delay, or prevent” communication to federal authorities
regarding a federal offense); 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(3) (2006) (stating that a defendant must
knowingly use intimidation, threats, corrupt persuasion, or misleading conduct toward
someone with then intent to obstruct a federal investigation or proceeding); and 18 U.S.C.
§ 1512(d)(2) (2006) (stating that a defendant must intend to harass a person resulting in
obstruction to federal proceedings or investigations).
44
Haney, supra note 39, at 63. Congress recognized a need to simplify and streamline
prosecutions of witness tampering under one comprehensive act. Id. However, the
Supreme Court has not specifically stated that the change in the language of § 1503
removed all protection against witness tampering from that Section. Shelby A.D. Moore,
Who is Keeping the Gate? What do we do when Prosecutors Breach the Ethical Responsibilities They
Have Sworn to Uphold?, 47 S. TEX. L. REV. 801, 842 (2006) (noting that Congress has clearly
stated in the respective statutes what it intended to criminalize).
45
18 U.S.C. § 1503 (2006). The current statute reads:
Whoever corruptly, or by threats or force, or by any threatening letter
or communication, endeavors to influence, intimidate, or impede any
grand or petit juror, or officer in or of any court of the United States . . .
or by any threatening letter or communication, influences, obstructs, or
impedes, or endeavors to influence, obstruct, or impede, the due
administration of justice, shall be punished . . .
18 U.S.C. § 1503 (2006) (emphasis added). However, the pre-VWPA version of § 1503 read:
Whoever corruptly, or by threats or force, or by any threatening letter
or communication, endeavors to influence, intimidate, or impede any
witness, in any court of the United States . . . or endeavors to influence,
obstruct or impede, the due administration of justice, shall be [punished].
18 U.S.C. § 1503 (1948) (amended 1982) (emphasis added). See also Pesce, supra note 28, at
1422. The current Omnibus Clause of § 1503 is most typically used in white-collar cases
which do not usually involve the type of witness tampering conduct specifically proscribed
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Initial judicial interpretation of § 1512 focused on its scope in reference to
§ 1503’s omnibus clause.46 Some courts interpreted § 1512 to provide
exclusive protection for witnesses.47 Other courts held that § 1512
provided protection for only that conduct enumerated in the statute and
did not preclude some forms of witness tampering from being
prosecuted under § 1503.48 Congress responded to this ambiguity by
amending § 1512 in 1988 to add to the Act a prohibition against corruptly
persuading a witness.49 Thus, Congress provided a mechanism for the
government to prosecute conduct not specifically enumerated in the
original enactment of § 1512 which also fell outside the reach of the
omnibus clause of § 1503.50 Since the enactment of the 1988 amendment,
under § 1512. Julie R. O’Sullivan, The Federal Criminal “Code” Is a Disgrace: Obstruction
Statutes as a Case Study, 96 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 643, 686 (2006).
46
E.g., United States v. Risken, 788 F.2d 1361 (8th Cir. 1986) (discussing congressional
enactment of § 1512 and revisions of § 1503); United States v. King, 762 F.2d 232, 237 (2d
Cir. 1985) (stating § 1512 reached only specified means of intimidation); United States v.
Wesley, 748 F.2d 962, 964 (5th Cir.. 1984) (holding that prosecutions for witness tampering
can be brought under both §§ 1503 and 1512). See also Pesce, supra note 28, at 1422 (arguing
that Congress meant § 1512 to be the exclusive protection for witnesses against
intimidation and tampering).
47
E.g., United States v. Hernandez, 730 F.2d 895, 898 (2d Cir. 1984) (holding that
prosecutions for witness tampering must be brought under § 1512 exclusively). See also
Pesce, supra note 28, at 1423 (listing three approaches courts used to interpret § 1512 in
relation to § 1503); Riley, supra note 36, at 259–65 (discussing different approaches of Circuit
Courts of Appeals regarding whether prosecutions for witness tampering fell exclusively
under § 1512 and arguing that Congress intended that § 1512 be the sole remedy for
witness tampering).
48
E.g., United States v. Kenny, 973 F.2d 339, 342 (4th Cir. 1992) (holding that enactment
of § 1512 does not preclude application of § 1503 to acts that obstruct justice as long as the
defendant is not prosecuted on both statutes.); United States v. Shively, 927 F.2d 804, 811
(5th Cir. 1991) (holding that § 1512 reaches only those acts specifically numerated in the
Act); Risken, 788 F.2d 1361 (holding that prosecutions for witness tampering could be
brought under §§ 1503 or 1512) (citing United States v. Lester, 749 F.2d 1288 (9th Cir. 1984));
Wesley, 748 F.2d 962 (holding that prosecutions for witness tampering can be brought
under both §§ 1503 and 1512). But see also Pesce, supra note 28, at 1423 (rejecting the
reasoning of the Fourth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits holding that prosecutions for witness
tampering can be brought under both § 1503 and § 1512).
49
18 U.S.C. § 1512(b) (2006) (as amended 1988). The relevant section of the pre-1988
version of § 1512(b) reads: “Whoever intentionally harasses another person and thereby
hinders, delays, prevents or dissuades any person” from participating in federal
proceedings or from communicating to a federal officer shall be punished. 18 U.S.C.
§ 1512(b) (1986). See also United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593, 597 (1995) (discussing the
appellate courts application of the pre-1988 version of § 1512). See also supra note 41
(quoting the current language of § 1512 relevant to this Note).
50
Haney, supra note 39, at 66 (stating that, by enacting this 1988 amendment, Congress
intended to provide witness and victim protection exclusively under § 1512). Most circuit
courts still allow prosecution of witness tampering under both §§ 1512 and 1503. See
United States v. Ladum, 141 F.3d 1328, 1338 (9th Cir. 1998) (discussing that the 1988
amendment to § 1512 did not repeal the omnibus clause of § 1503 and that both sections are

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2009

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 43, No. 2 [2009], Art. 8

782

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43

courts have generally limited the applicability of § 1512 to conduct
specifically enumerated within the statute.51 Therefore, defendants can
be prosecuted only for conduct enumerated within the statute.52
Moreover, in order for the government to prosecute such conduct, it
must also establish the requisite intent and jurisdiction.53
C. Intent and Jurisdiction Under § 1512
While Congress and the courts settled the issue of the general scope
of § 1512 in conjunction with § 1503, courts also focused on discussion of
the requisite elements needed for a successful prosecution under
§ 1512.54 The language of two major elements of § 1512 have consistently
presented questions for courts since the enactment of the VWPA.55 First,
the Act requires the government to establish that the defendant
performed any of the proscribed conduct with the intent to interfere with
coexistent); United States v. Tackett, 113 F.3d 603, 609 (6th Cir. 1997) (finding that Congress
did not intend to preclude the use of § 1503 when it passed § 1512); United States v.
Maloney, 71 F.3d 645, 659 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding that, so long as a defendant is not
prosecuted under both sections, Congress’s enactment of § 1512 does not preclude
prosecution for witness tampering under § 1503); United States v. Moody, 977 F.2d 1420,
1424 (11th Cir. 1992) (holding that witness tampering prosecutions can be brought under §§
1503 or 1512).
Some circuits consider the 1988 amendment to the Act to conclusively establish that
witness tampering should no longer be prosecuted under the omnibus clause of § 1503, but
solely under § 1512. See United States v. Masterpol, 940 F.2d 760 (2d Cir. 1991). See also
Haney, supra note 39, at 66 (discussing that while Congressional intent seems to be that
§ 1512 provides the exclusive mechanism for prosecuting a defendant for witness
tampering, some courts continue to allow witness tampering prosecutions under § 1503).
However, the majority of courts hold “that § 1512 is not the exclusive vehicle for
prosecution for witness tampering.” Moody, 977 F.2d at 1424.
51
United States v. Khatami, 280 F.3d 907, 912 (9th Cir. 2002) (stating that by its terms,
the Act prohibited those acts specifically listed); King, 762 F.2d 232 (holding that § 1512
reaches only conduct enumerated within the Act). See generally McLaughlin & Nahum,
supra note 28, at 814.
52
Khatami, 280 F.3d at 912; King, 762 F.2d at 237. See also McLaughlin & Nahum, supra
note 28, at 814.
53
See infra Part II.C (discussing the intent and jurisdictional elements of § 1512).
54
Surette, supra note 32, at 14. One of the first major cases to address a specific element
of § 1512 addressed the intent element of the Act. See United States v. Scaife, 749 F.2d 338,
348 (6th Cir. 1984). See also United States v. Leisure, 844 F.2d 1347 (8th Cir. 1988). Later
cases began to interpret the language of the statute which required that the witness or
victim communicate with a law enforcement officer. See United States v. Edwards, 36 F.3d
639, 645 (7th Cir. 1994); United States v. Stansfield, 101 F.3d 909, 917 (3d Cir. 1996); United
States v. Bell, 113 F.3d 1345, 1349 (3d Cir. 1997).
55
See Scaife, 749 F.2d at 348 (discussing the intent element of § 1512); Stansfield, 101 F.3d
at 918 (discussing the requirement that the government prove the defendant believed his
conduct would prevent communication with a federal officer); Bell, 113 F.3d 1345
(clarifying the decision in Stansfield).
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a proceeding or investigation.56 Second, the government must establish
that the proceeding or investigation with which the defendant intended
to interfere was federal in nature.57 The intent element has been
addressed by the United States Supreme Court.58 However, the
language of the jurisdictional element remains debated among the
Circuits as indicated by the recent decision of the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals in United States v. Harris.59 First, Part II.C.1 discusses the intent
element of the Act.60 Parts II.C.2 and II.C.3 then discuss the federal
nexus requirement.61 Finally, Part II.C.3 discusses the current split
regarding the nexus requirement.62
1.

Arthur Andersen—Settling Intent, but Leaving Open Federal Nexus

Although different subsections of § 1512 proscribe different conduct,
the element of intent is analyzed in the same manner for each.63 Under
18 U.S.C. § 1512 (2006). See also Scaife, 749 F.2d at 348; Surette, supra note 32, at 14; and
McLaughlin & Nahum, supra note 28, at 814.
57
18 U.S.C. § 1512 (2006). See also Surette, supra note 32, at 14; and McLaughlin &
Nahum, supra note 28, at 814. Section 1512 has many subsections which proscribe different
conduct, but the analysis regarding whether the proceeding or investigation is federal in
nature applies in equal force to all subsections. United States v. Baldyga, 233 F.3d 674, 680
n.5 (1st Cir. 2000); United States v. Diaz, 176 F3d 52, 91 (2d Cir. 1999); Veal, 153 F.3d at 1245.
58
See Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696 (2005).
59
Kearney, supra note 2. See also United States v. Harris, 498 F.3d 278, 286–87 (4th Cir.
2007) (holding that the government can establish a sufficient federal nexus by establishing
that the communication relates to the commission or possible commission of a federal
offense); United States v. Causey, 185 F.3d 407 (5th Cir. 1999) ; Veal, 153 F.3d at 1251
(holding that the government can establish a sufficient federal nexus by establishing the
information provide by a witness related to a possible federal offense and the possibility
existed that the information would be transferred to federal authorities). See infra generally
Part II.D.
60
See infra Part II.C.1 (discussing the Supreme Court’s decision in Arthur Andersen
defining the intent element of § 1512).
61
See infra Parts II.C.2–3 (discussing the federal nexus requirement of § 1512).
62
See infra Part II.C.4 (discussing the current circuit split regarding what constitutes a
proper federal nexus for purposes of § 1512).
63
18 U.S.C. § 1512 (2006). In order for the government to prosecute a defendant for any
conduct proscribed under § 1512, it must establish that the defendant acted with the intent
to interfere with or influence a person’s involvement in an investigation or official
proceeding. 18 U.S.C. § 1512 (2006). See also McLaughlin & Nahum, supra note 28, at 818;
supra note 58 (discussing that the analysis regarding the federal nexus is the same for all
subsections). Because the intent elements are analyzed in the same general manner for all
subsections of § 1512, this Note will focus on the subsection used most often to prosecute
under this section, § 1512(b). Section 1512(b) states that a defendant must “knowingly”
perform any of the specified conduct enumerated in the section with the intent to influence,
interfere with or obstruct an investigation or official proceeding. 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b) (2006).
See also supra note 41 (citing relevant parts of § 1512(b)). While the courts have addressed
what constitutes “corrupt persuasion,” “misleading conduct,” and other such conduct that
56
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the Act, the government must establish that the defendant acted
knowingly to commit conduct enumerated within the Act.64 In 2005, the
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in Arthur Andersen LLP v.
United States to specifically decide the knowledge requirement under
§ 1512.65
In that case, the defendant instructed its employees to destroy
documents according to its corporate document retention policy both
prior to and after the Security Exchange Commission (“SEC”) opened an
official investigation into the financial condition of one of the
defendant’s major clients.66 The government brought an indictment
falls within the purview of the Act, the courts’ analysis as to the definition and scope of
such conduct is beyond the scope of this Note.
64
18 U.S.C. § 1512(b) (2006). See Guadalupe, 402 F.3d 409; Khatami, 280 F.3d at 912; King,
762 F.2d 232. See also McLaughlin & Nahum, supra note 28, at 813.
65
Arthur Andersen LLP, 544 U.S. 696. At issue in the case was whether the instructions
given to the jury adequately conveyed the elements required under the Act to convict the
defendant of knowingly using intimidation to corruptly persuade witnesses with the intent
to tamper with a federal proceeding. Id. at 698. Specifically, the Court considered the
requisite intent under § 1512 and held that a person could not be found to have acted
“knowingly” if he lacked awareness of any wrongdoing on his part. Id. at 706. In Arthur
Andersen, the court’s analysis focused on the requisite intent needed to show a defendant
acted knowingly to interfere with a proceeding. Id. at 706. The defendant was convicted of
corruptly persuading employees to tamper with evidence under § 1512(b)(2) of the VWPA
when the company’s auditors instructed its employees to destroy documents according to
company policy. Id. The Court remanded the case because it found that the jury
instructions failed to instruct the jury to find specifically that the auditors acted with
knowledge that the destruction of the documents would corruptly interfere with a
proceeding. Id. Thus, in order to convict a defendant under § 1512, the government must
establish that the defendant knowingly acted to interfere with an investigation or
proceeding. Id. See generally Harold S. Bloomenthal & Samuel Wolff, Definition of Securities
and Exempt Offerings, 3 SEC. & FED. CORP. L. § 1:188 (2d ed. 2007) (discussing the factual
background of Arthur Andersen and the trial judge’s handling of the case); John Hasnas, The
Significant Meaninglessness of Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 2005 CATO SUP. CT. REV.
187 (2005) (discussing the factual background and effect of the Court’s decision in Arthur
Andersen); O’Sullivan, supra note 46, at 694-96 (discussing the factual and procedural
background of Arthur Andersen).
66
Arthur Andersen LLP, 544 U.S. at 701–02. The defendant, Arthur Andersen provided
auditing services to the Enron Corporation, a major energy conglomerate. Id. at 699. After
Enron’s financial performance began to decline, the public became aware of possible
improprieties within the corporation. Id. In anticipation of future litigation, Enron retained
outside counsel to represent the corporation in any possible litigation. Id. After the SEC
notified Enron that it would most likely investigate any improprieties, the defendant
instructed its employees at a general training meeting and in subsequent e-mails and
notifications to conform to Enron’s document retention policy. Id. at 701. The SEC opened
an official investigation into the matter one week after the final notification to Enron’s
employees. Id. at 702. However, document destruction continued for an additional week
until the SEC subpoenaed the documents. Id. at 699.
The Enron scandal was not Arthur Andersen’s only debacle during the time period
preceding the SEC investigation. Elizabeth K. Ainslie, Indicting Corporations Revisited:
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against the defendant for tampering with witnesses. A jury found
Arthur Andersen guilty of tampering with witnesses by corruptly
persuading them to alter, destroy, or withhold documents needed in an
official proceeding under the Act.67 The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed, holding that the jury did not need to find any “conscious
wrongdoing” in order to convict the defendant under the Act.68
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine the
meaning of “knowingly” within § 1512.69 The Court noted that it
Lessons of the Arthur Andersen Prosecution, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 107 (2006) (discussing
Arthur Andersen’s downfall and the resulting repercussions). See also Jonathon M.
Redgrave, R. Christopher Cook & Charles R. Ragan, Looking Beyond Arthur Andersen: The
Impact on Corporate Records and Information Management Policies and Practices, 52 FED. LAW.
32, 33 (2005) (discussing Arthur Andersen’s involvement in other scandals and the facts
leading up to the SEC investigation into Enron). Several other cases arose from Arthur
Andersen’s accounting and auditing services of other large corporations, such as Waste
Management Corporation and Sunbeam Corporation. Ainslie, supra, at 107.
67
Arthur Andersen LLP, 544 U.S. at 699. Specifically, the federal government charged
defendant under §§ 1512(b)(2)(A) and (B). Id. at 698. These sections of the Act proscribe
anyone from intimidating, threatening or corruptly persuading another person to withhold
records or “alter, destroy, mutilate, or conceal an object. . . for use in an official
proceeding[.]” 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(2)(B) (2006). In order to reach its decision, the jury
required additional instructions from the judge clarifying the requisite elements under the
Act. Bloomenthal & Wolff, supra note 65. Post-verdict interviews indicate that the jurors’
findings may have been faulty and confused despite these further instructions. Id.
68
Arthur Andersen LLP, 544 U.S. at 698. Specifically, the jury found the defendant guilty
of violating § 1512(b)(2)(A) which prohibits tampering with documents that a witness may
provide to authorities for use in official proceedings. Id. Currently, in factual
circumstances such as those in Arthur Andersen, the government would most likely bring
the action under § 1512(c)(1) because Congress enacted the Sarbanes-Oxley Act shortly
after the decision to amend § 1512(c) in order to address specifically corrupt document
destruction. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745, 800 (2002)
(amending § 1512(c)(1)). The Amendment proscribes alteration, destruction, mutilation or
concealment of documents or objects. Id. See also supra note 41 (citing the current language
of the statute). In addition to broadening the scope of § 1512(c), the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
made, among other things, falsification of documents meant to be used in federal
investigations a crime. 18 U.S.C. § 1519 (2006). See also Albert D. Spalding, Jr. & Mary
Ashby Morrison, Criminal Liability for Document Shredding after Arthur Andersen LLP, 43 AM.
BUS. L.J. 647, 648 (2006).
69
Arthur Andersen LLP, 544 U.S. at 702. A split developed in the circuits regarding the
requisite intent needed to show that a defendant acted knowingly to corruptly persuade a
witness. United States v. Shotts, 145 F.3d 1289, 1301 (11th Cir. 1998) (discussing several
circuits’ interpretation of the intent element of § 1512(b)); Khatami, 280 F.3d at 913
(discussing the differing interpretations § 1512(b)). The Second and Eleventh Circuits
Courts of Appeals interpreted “‘corruptly persuade’” to encompass conduct meant to
persuade out of motivation for an improper purpose. Shotts, 145 F.3d at 1301; United States
v. Thompson, 76 F.3d 442 (2d Cir. 1996). However, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals
expressly rejected this definition and held that a defendant must do more than attempt to
discourage a witness’ participation in an official proceeding. United States v. Farrell, 126
F.3d 484, 489–490 (3d Cir. 1997). While the court specifically addressed the meaning of
“knowingly . . . corruptly persuade[][,]” Arthur Andersen has been cited to repeatedly in
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generally exercises restraint in interpreting a federal criminal statute for
two reasons: (1) the prerogatives of Congress deserve due deference
from the judiciary, and (2) individuals deserve fair warning of whether
certain conduct is punishable under the law.70 Therefore, the Court
limited its interpretation to the plain language of the statute and found
that
“knowingly”
implies
“awareness,
understanding,
or
consciousness.”71 Thus, the Court held that, in order for a conviction
under § 1512, the government must establish a person was conscious of
wrongdoing when he acted to affect a proceeding or investigation.72
Although the Court in Arthur Andersen specifically addressed the
requirement that a defendant consciously act to interfere with an official
proceeding, the Court only briefly addressed what was needed to satisfy
the jurisdictional requirement of the Act.73 The Court held that, in order
later cases to elucidate more generally the meaning of “knowingly[.]” See United States v.
Quattrone, 441 F.3d 153, 176 (2d Cir. 2006) (citing Arthur Andersen to hold that “§ 1512(b)
requires proof of a mental state that is knowingly corrupt with respect to the action
taken”); Harris, 498 F.3d at 288–89 (citing Arthur Andersen to note that § 1512(b) requires
that the government show that the defendant acted with some knowledge that his actions
would interfere with an official proceeding). However, courts have not extended Arthur
Andersen to negate § 1512(g), which states that the government need not prove state of
mind with regard to the federal nature of official proceeding or the judge of law
enforcement officer. Id. at 288.
70
Arthur Andersen LLP, 544 U.S. at 703. The court went on to explain that persuasion by
itself can manifest itself in many innocuous situations, such as a mother persuading her
child to keep confidences or an attorney persuading his client not to turn over documents
that fall within attorney-client privilege. Id. at 704.
71
Id. at 705. The Court stated that it “traditionally [has] exercised restraint in assessing
the reach of a federal criminal statute, both out of deference to the prerogatives of Congress
. . . and out of concern that ‘a fair warning should be given to the world in language that
the common world will understand, of what the law intends to do if a certain line is
passed[.]’” Id. at 703 (citing United States v. Dowling, 473 U.S. 207 (1985) and United States
v. McBoyle, 515 U.S. 593 (1931)). The Court analyzed the language within the Act and
concluded that “corruptly” is “normally associated with wrongful, immoral, depraved, or
evil.” Id. at 705. Thus, the Court concluded that persons must be conscious of wrongdoing
to have the required culpability under § 1512(b). Id.
72
Id. The Court remanded the case for further findings on whether the defendant acted
with knowledge that advising employees to comply with company document retention
programs would wrongly interfere with a future official proceeding. Id. Specifically, the
Supreme Court held that the jury instructions did not adequately state the mens rea
required under the statute. Bloomenthal & Wolff, supra note 65. On remand, a court
sentenced Arthur Andersen to five years probation and fined the firm $500,000. Ainslie,
supra note 66. Also, the firm agreed to cease operation of its public auditing companies
which in effect ended all business for Arthur Andersen. Id. As a result of the cessation of
business, 28,000 of the firm’s employees were left unemployed. Id.
73
Arthur Andersen LLP, 544 U.S. at 707–08. The Court’s main finding was that the jury
instructions improperly defined the requisite intent required under the Act. Id. at 706.
However, the Court also found the jury instructions infirm because the instructions did not
instruct the jury to find any relationship between the federal investigation and the
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to establish a federal nexus, the government must show both a defendant
could foresee that his actions were likely to obstruct federal proceedings
and the defendant acted with the intent to do so.74 However, the Court
did not enunciate a test that would determine exactly what constituted a
federal nexus in order to bring the defendant under § 1512 of the
VWPA.75
Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Arthur Andersen, a
disagreement among the circuits developed regarding what constituted
a sufficient nexus to bring a defendant under the jurisdiction of the
VWPA.76 However, the specific issue in Arthur Andersen did not concern
this nexus requirement; therefore, the Court held only that some nexus
was required in order for a defendant to be convicted under the federal
statute.77 In contrast, in United States v. Aguilar, the Supreme Court
addressed the nexus requirement of a similar statute.78

defendant’s destruction of the documents. Id. at 707. The Court found that the jury
instructions improperly led the jury to conclude that it was not required to find any nexus
between the persuasion to destroy documents and any proceeding and held that a nexus
must be found to exist between the act to influence testimony and a particular official
proceeding. Id.
74
Id. at 707–08 (stating that “[i]t is . . . one thing to say that a proceeding ‘need not be
pending or about to be instituted at the time of the offense,’ and quite another to say a
proceeding need not even be foreseen.”).
75
Id. at 708. When discussing the federal nexus requirement, the Court referred to its
decision interpreting the nexus requirement of § 1503. Id. (citing to Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593 ).
The Court in Arthur Andersen stated that with regard to § 1503, the statute “required
something more—specifically, a nexus between the obstructive act and the proceeding.”
Id. Thus, the Court would also require that the government establish that some ‘nexus’
exists between a defendant’s conduct and a federal investigation or proceeding in
prosecutions under § 1512. Id.
76
United States v. Perry, 335 F.3d 316, 321 n.7 (4th Cir. 2003). The Fourth Circuit Court
of Appeals in Perry noted that the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Veal had
established a nexus requirement which deviated from the test enunciated in other circuits.
Id. See also United States v. Applewhaite, 195 F.3d 679 (3d Circ. 1999); Veal, 153 F.3d 1233;
United States v. Causey, 185 F.3d 407 (5th Cir. 1999); Bell, 113 F.3d 1345; United States v.
Stansfield, 101 F.3d 909 (3d Cir. 1996); United States v. Edwards, 36 F.3d 639 (7th Cir. 1994).
77
Arthur Andersen, 544 U.S. at 708. The Court held that “‘if the defendant lacks
knowledge that his actions are likely to affect the judicial proceeding’ . . . ‘he lacks the
requisite intent to obstruct.’” Id. The Court’s focus in the case rested on the meaning of
“knowingly . . . corruptly persuade[][.]” See supra note 69 and accompanying text
(discussing the Court’s analysis of the intent element).
78
515 U.S. 593 (1995). See discussion infra Part II.C.2.
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United States v. Aguilar: Federal Nexus Under 18 U.S.C. § 1503

The United States Supreme Court addressed the federal nexus
requirement of the omnibus clause of § 1503 in United States v. Aguilar.79
During an interview conducted prior to the commencement of grand
jury proceedings against an individual suspected of embezzling funds
from a union, Judge Robert P. Aguilar lied to Federal Bureau of
Investigation (“FBI”) agents about his involvement in the crime.80 Later,
after trial and appeal, the United States Supreme Court affirmed the
Ninth Circuit’s reversal of Judge Aguilar’s conviction of obstruction of
justice.81
The Supreme Court reasoned that a defendant must act with the
intent to influence grand jury or judicial proceedings and not simply to

Id. In that case, a jury convicted Judge Robert P. Aguilar of illegally disclosing a
wiretap under 18 U.S.C. § 2232(c) and of obstruction of justice under § 1503. Id. at 595. The
Ninth Circuit reversed both convictions because it found neither statute proscribed his
conduct. United States v. Aguilar, 21 F.3d 1475 (9th Cir. 1994), rev’d in part, aff’d in part, 515
U.S. 593 (1995). The Supreme Court subsequently reversed the decision of the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals regarding the § 2232(c) conviction and affirmed the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit’s reversal of Judge Aguilar’s conviction under § 1503.
Aguilar, 515 U.S. at 596.
The Court granted certiorari to specifically address the issues of “whether § 1503
punishes false statements made to potential grand jury witnesses[]” and to answer a
question regarding another federal statute. Id. at 595. The Court found that § 1503
protected only those persons listed in the statute, grand or petit jurors or officers of federal
courts. Id. While discussing who constituted a person protected under § 1503, the Court
also addressed the scope of conduct prohibited under the statute. Id. at 599.
80
Id. at 597. The timing of the interview proved to be the decisive factor for the United
States Supreme Court. Id. at 599. The Court held that a defendant could not be convicted
under § 1503 for obstructing an ancillary proceeding to a grand jury proceeding because §
1503 protects only witnesses and grand or petit jurors in pending proceedings and not
possible witnesses or jurors who might testify in a future proceeding. Id. at 601.
Conversely, an FBI agent is merely an investigatory official of the government, and FBI
investigations are not judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings as defined by § 1503. Id. Thus,
the interview conducted by the FBI to the commencement of any such proceedings did not
fall within the protection of § 1503. Id. See also CORPORATE COUNSEL’S GUIDE TO WHITECOLLAR CRIME § 1:32 (2007) (discussing the findings and holding of the Supreme Court’s
decision in Aguilar); James K. Fitzpatrick, The Supreme Court’s Bipolar Approach to the
Interpretation of 18 U.S.C. § 1503 and 18 U.S.C. § 2232(c), 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1383,
1383–84 (1996) (discussing the facts and procedural history of Aguilar); O’Sullivan, supra
note 45, at 691–93 (discussing the facts and rationale of the Court in Aguilar).
81
Aguilar, 515 U.S. at 597. A jury convicted Aguilar of “endeavoring to obstruct the due
administration of justice in violation of § 1503.” Id. at 595. The Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals reversed the conviction on a hearing en banc, holding that the statutory language
of § 1503 did not cover Aguilar’s conduct in the FBI interview because Aguilar had not
interfered with a pending proceeding. Id. In finding § 1503 inapplicable in the situation,
the Court noted that the FBI had not been authorized by a grand jury to conduct the
interview. Id.
79
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affect an ancillary proceeding independent of the court’s or grand jury’s
authority.82 The Court also held that a defendant must act with the
knowledge that his conduct will have the “natural and probable” effect
of interfering with a grand jury or judicial proceeding.83 Justices Scalia,
Kennedy, and Thomas concurred in part and dissented in part in the
decision, finding that the omnibus clause of § 1503 extended to ancillary
proceedings because the clause makes “endeavor[ing]” to interfere with

Id. at 599 (stating that the actions of “the accused must be with an intent to influence
judicial or grand jury proceedings[]”). The Supreme Court affirmed the finding of the
Ninth Circuit of Appeals that an interview conducted before the commencement of grand
jury proceedings is ancillary to those proceedings and does not fall within the protection of
§ 1503. Id. at 597. Also, the Court found that the government’s assertions were too
speculative to support a conviction because the agent to whom Judge Aguilar lied to had
not been subpoenaed nor was there any indication he would be. Id. at 601. See also David
D. Jividen, Charging Post-Offense Obstructive Actions, A.F.L REV. 113 (1996) (discussing
obstruction of justice within the military justice system). However, a later opinion of the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals questions whether the statute’s text requires a finding that
a proceeding is pending. United States v. Novak, 217 F.3d 566 (8th Cir. 2000). See also
O’Sullivan, supra note 45, at 687.
83
Aguilar, 515 U.S at 601 (stating that the defendant must act with the knowledge that
his conduct will “have the ‘natural and probable effect’ of interfering with the due
administration of justice.”). Thus, the Court interpreted an endeavor to influence as
anything that has “‘the natural and probable effect’ of interfering with the due
administration of justice.” Id. See also Mark Mermelsetin & Charlotte Decker, Walk the Line:
Attorneys Will Find Statutory Language of Limited Use in Determining What Constitutes
Obstruction of Justice, LOS ANGELES LAW., Dec. 2006, at 27, 30 (discussing the implications of
the Court’s decision in Aguilar to practicing attorneys). However, the Court clarified that
the defendant could still be convicted under § 1503 even though the subpoenaed witness
was ultimately not called to testify, as long as the defendant acted with the intent to
influence the proceedings. Aguilar, 515 U.S at 602. The example given by the Court was
that:
Were a defendant with the requisite intent to lie to a subpoenaed
witness who is ultimately not called to testify, or who testifies but does
not transmit the defendant’s version of the story, the defendant has
endeavored to obstruct, but has not actually obstructed, justice. Under
our approach, a jury could find such defendant guilty.
Id.
The Court’s decision to enunciate a nexus requirement for § 1503 has met some
criticism. See Fitzpatrick, supra note 80, at 1383-84; O’Sullivan, supra note 45, at 687.
Commentators argue that the plain language of the statute and prior case law adequately
support the Court’s holding in Aguilar without requiring the Court to establish the natural
and probable effect test set forth in the decision. Id. Also, they argue that legislative
history of the statute shows that Congress did not intend the statute to be construed as
narrowly as the Court read it in Aguilar. Fitzpatrick, supra note 80, at 1403. These
arguments find some support in Justice Scalia’s dissent in the case, in which he criticizes
the majority’s distortion of the natural and probable effects test set forth in a prior decision
interpreting the predecessor statute to § 1503. Aguilar, 515 U.S. at 611 (1995) (Scalia, J.,
Kennedy, J., and Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
82
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the due administration of justice a crime.84 Thus, according to Justice
Scalia, any act the defendant commits with the intent to obstruct a
proceeding is sufficient to establish a sufficient nexus under § 1503.85
While Aguilar has been cited several times in reference to § 1512,
courts cite Aguilar only to elucidate the fact that a nexus must be shown
between a statutorily forbidden act and a federal proceeding.86 Section
1503 protection extends only to grand jury members and court officials;
on the other hand, § 1512 extends to any person who might participate in
an investigation or proceeding.87
Because different jurisdictional
84
Aguilar, 515 U.S. at 610 (Scalia, J., Kennedy, J., and Thomas, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). While the dissent did argue that § 1503 did extend to ancillary
proceedings, they did note that the clause is not unlimited, because the government is
required to prove that the defendant acted with the purpose to interfere. Id. at 611 (Scalia,
J., dissenting). The dissent states that § 1503 is limited by its own language because it only
reaches “purposeful efforts to obstruct the due administration of justice, i.e., acts performed
with that very object in mind.” Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). The
dissent noted that specific intent to obstruct justice could be shown where the defendant
intentionally committed a “wrongful act that had obstruction of justice as its ‘natural and
probable consequence.’” Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). See also Fitzpatrick, supra note 80, at
1399 (discussing Justice Scalia’s interpretation of § 1503). Thus, Scalia argued that Judge
Aguilar’s actions did violate the Omnibus Clause of § 1503, and the jury properly convicted
him of obstruction of justice under the statute. Id.
Regarding the dissent’s disposition on the rest of the issues in the case, the three
Justices concurred in the holding regarding violations of other statutes but disagreed with
the majority’s affirmation of the Ninth Circuit’s reversal of the § 1503 conviction. Id. at 609
(Scalia, J., Kennedy, J., Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice
Stevens concurred in the Court’s disposition of § 15103 but dissented regarding the
defendant’s conviction under another statute. Id. at 607 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
85
Id. at 613 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that “an act committed with the intent to
obstruct is all that matters[]”) (emphasis in original). See also Fitzpatrick, supra note 80, at
1402 (stating that Congress did not intend the Omnibus Clause of § 1503 to be narrowly
construed).
86
See Harris, 498 F.3d at 286 (citing Aguilar to hold that “[s]o long as the information the
defendant seeks to suppress actually relates to the commission or possible commission of a
federal offense, the federal nexus requirement is established.”).
87
18 U.S.C. § 1503 (2006). The relevant part of § 1503 states:
Whoever corruptly, or by threats or force, or by any threatening letter
or communication, endeavors to influence, intimidate, or impede any
grand or petit juror, or officer in or of any court of the United States, or officer
who may be serving at any examination or other proceeding before
any United States magistrate judge or other committing magistrate, in
the discharge of his duty, or injures any such grand or petit juror in his
person or property on account of any verdict or indictment assented to
by him, or on account of his being or having been such juror, or injures
any such officer, magistrate judge, or other committing magistrate in his
person or property on account of the performance of his official duties
....
18 U.S.C. § 1503(a) (2006) (emphasis added). See also supra note 46 (contrasting the current
statute with its predecessor). Protection under § 1512 extends to “any person” who may
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prerequisites are required under each separate section, lower courts find
Aguilar persuasive but do not find it controlling with regard to
§ 1512(g)’s jurisdictional element.88
The Supreme Court has held and circuit courts agree that a federal
nexus must exist before a defendant may be prosecuted under § 1512 of
the VWPA, but the circuit courts disagree as to what satisfies this
requirement with regard to § 1512.89 Several courts have interpreted
§ 1512 to require that a victim communicate directly to a federal officer.90
However, other courts require only that the acts reported by a witness
constitute a federal crime and that a possibility exists that the witness’
information would be transferred to a federal officer.91
communicate to a federal officer regarding a federal offense regardless of the conduct used
to intimidate. 18 U.S.C. § 1512 (2006). Under § 1512(a)(1), a defendant is prohibited from
killing or attempting to kill another person with the intent to “prevent the attendance or
testimony of any person in an official proceeding[.]” 18 U.S.C. § 1512(a)(1)(A) (2006)
(emphasis added). Also, the statute prohibits an individual from using “physical force or
the threat of physical force against any person, or attempts to do so, with the intent to . . .
influence, delay, or prevent the testimony of any person in an official proceeding[.]” 18
U.S.C. § 1512(a)(2)(A) (2006) (emphasis added). Finally, § 1512(b) prohibits an individual
from knowingly intimidating, threatening “another person[]” with the intent to “influence,
delay, or prevent the testimony of any person in an official proceeding[.]” 18 U.S.C.
§ 1512(b)(1) (2006) (emphasis added).
88
Veal, 153 F.3d at 1249 (stating that the numerous obstruction of justice statutes
“contain distinct jurisdictional prerequisites necessary for invoking federal authority to
prosecute specific conduct.”). The Eleventh Circuit, in Veal, held that the Supreme Court’s
decision in Aguilar was controlling because § 1503 implicates the “government’s interest in
preserving the integrity of a judicial proceeding[,]” while § 1512(b) implicates other
government interest outside a federal judicial proceeding. Id. at 1250. But see United States
v. Quattrone, 441 F.3d 153, 176 (2d Cir. 2006) (stating that “the evidence that was sufficient
to establish the nexus element for the section 1503 charge applies with equal force to
establishing that element of the witness tampering charge” and that “Aguilar’s nexus
requirement applies to some degree to section 1512(b)[]”).
89
Kearney, supra note 2. See also Guadalupe, 402 F.3d 409 (discussing the disagreement
between the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits); Veal, 153 F.3d 1233 (extending the reach of §
1512); Causey, 185 F.3d 407 (refusing to apply the reasoning of the Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals).
90
See Bell, 113 F.3d 1345 (finding a sufficient nexus because the witness communicated
with members of a joint federal and state investigation); Stansfield, 101 F.3d 909 (finding a
sufficient nexus because the defendant attacked the witness six months after federal
officials took over the investigation); Scaife, 749 F.2d 338 (finding a nexus because the
informants communicated directly with federal authorities). See also discussion infra Parts
II.C.3 (discussing the Scaife decision); Part II.D (discussing the Bell and Stansfield decisions).
91
See Harris, 498 F.3d 278 (finding a sufficient nexus because local officials later turned
the investigation over to federal authorities); Guadalupe, 402 F.3d 409 (finding a federal
nexus when the initial investigators later reported the witness’ testimony to federal
officials); United States v. Baldyga, 233 F.3d 674 (1st Cir. 2000) (finding a sufficient nexus
where federal officials joined an investigation initially begun by local and state authorities);
and Veal, 153 F.3d 1233 (finding a sufficient federal nexus when the witness communicated
to local authorities who later relayed this communication to federal authorities).
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Knowledge of the Federal Nature of the Proceeding Not Required

Several courts have adjudicated the question of what is sufficient to
provide jurisdiction under § 1512 of the VWPA.92 Courts often refer to
two subsections of § 1512 when analyzing whether a defendant’s
conduct falls within the purview of the Act.93 According to the Act, the
government does not have to establish that, at the time the defendant
acted to interfere with the statute, an official proceeding was pending or
about to be instituted.94 Also, the government does not have to establish
that the defendant possessed knowledge that the proceeding or
investigation he meant to interfere with was federal in nature.95 Early
cases discussing whether the government must establish that a
defendant knew the proceeding was federal in nature at the time he
acted to interfere with a proceeding usually involved defendants who
acted to interfere with investigations or proceedings that were in fact
federal.96 The main case illustrating this and interpreting the knowledge
requirement under § 1512 is United States v. Scaife.97
See, e.g., Harris, 498 F.3d 278 ; Perry, 335 F.3d 316; Veal, 153 F.3d 1233; Causey, 185 F.3d
407; Bell, 113 F.3d 1345; Stansfield, 101 F.3d 909. See generally McLaughlin & Nahum, supra
note 28, at 817; Surette, supra note 32, at 48–66; Brendan Kearney, supra note 2. See also supra
Part II.D (discussing the current circuit split).
93
18 U.S.C §§ 1512(f) and (g) (2006). Section 1512(f) states that “[f]or purposes of this
section . . . an official proceeding need not be pending or about to be instituted at the time
of the offense[.]” 18 U.S.C. § 1512(f)(1) (2006). Section 1512(g) states that:
In a prosecution for an offense under this section, no state of mind
need be proved with respect to the circumstance—
(1) that the official proceeding before a judge, court, magistrate judge,
grand jury, or government agency is before a judge or court of the
United States, a United States magistrate judge, a bankruptcy judge, a
Federal grand jury, or a Federal Government agency; or
(2) that the judge is a judge of the United States or that the law
enforcement officer is an officer or employee of the Federal
Government or a person authorized to act for or on behalf of the
Federal Government or serving the Federal Government as an adviser
or consultant.
18 U.S.C. § 1512(g) (2006).
94
18 U.S.C. § 1512(f)(1) (West, Westlaw through P.L. 110-317 (excluding P.L. 110-234,
110-246, and 110-315) approved Aug. 29, 2008). The statute specifically reads: “For the
purposes of this section . . . an official proceeding need not be pending or about to be
instituted at the time of the offense[.]” Id. See generally Surette, supra note 32 (discussing
the construction and application of the Act).
95
See 18 U.S.C. § 1512(g). See generally Surette, supra note 32 (discussing the elements of
§ 1512).
96
See Scaife, 749 F.2d 338. See also Davis, 932 F.2d at 761 (stating that government need
not prove the defendant knew the proceeding he was tampering with was federal); United
States v. Gonzalez, 922 F.2d 1044, 1054 (2d Cir. 1991) (stating that the government is not
required to prove “defendant’s state of mind with respect to the elements of the federal
nature of the proceeding, the judge, agency, or law enforcement officer.”); United States v.
92
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In Scaife, FBI informants assisted officials in a federal investigation
that eventually led to the defendants’ arrests.98 After these arrests, the
defendants conspired to kill the informants and two co-defendants who
had agreed to testify against them in order to prevent the informants and
co-defendants from testifying at their trial.99 The defendants were
subsequently convicted of witness tampering under § 1512, and on
appeal argued that the conviction was improper because the government
did not establish that the defendants knew the informants would testify
before a grand jury nor did the government prove that grand jury
proceedings were pending at the time of the attempted interference.100
However, the court held that the plain language of the Act did not
require the government to prove that the defendant knew a federal
grand jury or federal law enforcement officers were involved because the
Act does not require the government to show that a defendant was
Kelley, 36 F.3d 1118, 1128 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (stating that the Act “does not require explicit
proof . . . that such proceedings were pending or were about to be instituted[]” at the time
the defendant acted to obstruct the proceedings). “The analysis regarding the federal
character of the crime and the relevant authorities applies with equal force to any
consideration of a conviction under § 1512.” United States v. Baldyga, 233 F.3d 674, 680 n.5
(1st Cir. 2000) (citing to United States v. Diaz, 176 F.3d 52, 91 (2d Cir. 1999)).
97
Scaife, 749 F.2d 338. A jury convicted both defendants of conspiring to violate the
Hobbs Act, aiding and abetting the use and possession of a firearm during the commission
of a felony, and witness tampering. Id. at 341. Both defendants argued for reversal based
on a multitude of arguments, including violation of the Speedy Trial Act and misjoinder.
Id. at 343–44. These additional arguments are outside the scope of this Note.
98
Id. at 341. Defendants recruited two co-conspirators from a previous robbery, but
who had since become FBI informants. Id. at 341. The FBI monitored the group’s conduct
and recorded conversations setting forth the plan to rob an Arkansas general store and fur
store for three days leading up to the night of the planned robbery. Id. at 341–42. The FBI
arrested the conspirators as they assembled to accomplish the plan. Id. at 342.
99
Id. Two of the codefendants eventually pled guilty after their arrest and agreed to
testify against the two defendants. Id. After learning of this, one of the defendants
contacted Hosea Moore to ask for help in a plan to kill the two codefendants. Id. Moore
then contacted the FBI and cooperated with officials in the investigation leading to the
defendant’s arrest and conviction of witness tampering under the Act. Id.
100
Id. at 348. The defendants argued that § 1512 required that the government prove
both that the defendants were aware that the informants planned to testify at trial and that
the grand jury proceedings had begun prior to the attempted interference. Id. Defendants
also tried to argue that the government never established proper venue for the witness
tampering charge. Id. at 346. However, the court held that the government proved proper
venue because the grand jury proceeding with which the defendants wished to interfere
was located in the district in which the court sat. Id. See also Peter Schleck & Gregory S.
Wright, Interference with the Judicial Process, 30 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 789, 805 (1993) (discussing
proper venue in § 1512 prosecutions). Courts initially differed on whether this construction
of the statute was proper until Congress amended § 1512. Id. Section 1512(i) clarifies that
venue is proper “in the district in which the official proceeding (whether or not pending or
about to be instituted) was intended to be affected or in the district in which the conduct
constituting the alleged offense occurred.” Id. at 806 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1512(h)).
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subjectively aware that the proceeding or investigation, with which he
acted to interfere, was federal in nature.101 The rule established in
Scaife has generally been adopted by all jurisdictions.102 The government
need only establish that a defendant acted with the belief that his
conduct would interfere with an investigation or proceeding.103
However, a circuit split currently exists regarding the precise level of
federal involvement in the investigation or proceeding to establish a
sufficient federal nexus.104
Scaife, 749 F.2d at 348. See also 18 U.S.C. § 1512(d) (2006). The court stated that it was
obvious from the facts that the defendant intended to use intimidation or force against the
informant in order to prevent the informant from giving information to any official
regarding the underlying offense. Scaife, 749 F.2d at 348. Under the plain language of
§ 1512(d), the government did not need to establish that the officials involved were, in fact,
federal officials. Id. But see Christopher R. Chase, To Shred or Not to Shred: Document
Retention Policies and Federal Obstruction of Justice Statutes, 8 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 721,
740–41 (2003) (stating that the Fifth Circuit requires some circumstantial proof of a
defendant’s intent to influence testimony in a pending federal proceeding). The Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals, in United States v. Shively, explained that “Scaife does not obviate
every facet of the government’s obligation to prove intent under § 1512.” 927 F.2d 804, 812
(5th Cir. 1991). The Fifth Circuit requires “at least a circumstantial showing of [an] intent to
affect testimony at some particular federal proceeding . . . .” in order for the conduct to be
proscribed under the Act. Id. (emphasis added). However, the court acknowledged that
§ 1512 does not require the government to prove that the proceeding is pending or about to
be instituted. Id. at 812. See also Kathleen F. Brickey, Andersen’s Fall from Grace, 81 WASH U.
L.Q. 917, 932 n.79 (2003).
102
See, e.g., United States v. Kelley, 36 F.3d 1118, 1128 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (citing to Scaife in
stating that the Act “does not require explicit proof . . . that such proceedings were pending
or were about to be instituted[]” at the time the defendant acted to obstruct the
proceedings” ); United States v. Davis, 932 F.2d 752, 761 (9th Cir. 1991) (citing to Scaife in
stating that the government need not prove “the defendant knew he was tampering with a
federal proceeding[]”); United States v. Gonzalez, 922 F.2d 1044 (2d Cir. 1991) (citing to
Scaife in stating that the government is not required to prove “defendant’s state of mind
with respect to the elements of the federal nature of the proceeding, the judge, agency, or
law enforcement officer.”). See generally McLaughlin & Nahum, supra note 28, at 817;
Surette, supra note 32, at 15–16. Even the decision of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in
Shively recognizes that a defendant need not be aware that a particular proceeding is
federal, as long as the proceeding is in fact federal. Shively, 927 F.2d at 812.
103
United States v. Romero, 54 F.3d 56 (2d Cir. 1995) (citing United States v. Leisure, 844
F.2d 1347, 1364 (8th Cir. 1988)) (stating that the government need only establish that a
defendant acted with intent to prevent potential witnesses from giving information to
federal officials); United States v. Edwards, 36 F.3d 639, 645 (7th Cir. 1994) (stating that “the
presence of an investigation or judicial proceedings is immaterial as long as there is
evidence that the defendant believed that a person might furnish information to federal
officials and that he killed or attempted to kill that person in order to prevent such
disclosure[]”) (citing Leisure, 844 F.2d at 1364 ) (emphasis in original) abrogated on other
grounds by U.S. v. Monroe 73 F.3d 129 (7th Cir. 1995).
104
See, e.g. Harris,498 F.3d 278; Guadalupe, 402 F.3d 409; Perry, 335 F.3d 316; Applewhaite,
195 F.3d 679; United States v. Bell, 113 F.3d 1345; Causey, 185 F.3d 407; Stansfield, 101 F.3d
909. See also infra Part II.D (discussing the current split among the circuits regarding the
federal nexus requirement of § 1512).
101

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol43/iss2/8

Hart: Falling Through the Cracks: The Shortcomings of Victim and Witnes

2009]

Federal Victim and Witness Protection Act

795

D. The Circuit Split
One of the first circuits to construe the federal nexus requirement of
§ 1512 was the Third Circuit in United States v. Stansfield105 and United
States v. Bell.106 Following these decisions, other circuits, such as the
Eleventh and Fourth Circuits, have construed this requirement of the
statute broadly to extend the reach of § 1512. The Third Circuit Court of
Appeals has recently relied on both its earlier decisions and the Eleventh
Circuit’s interpretation when applying the federal nexus requirement to
prosecutions under § 1512.107
In Stansfield, local officials obtained evidence through a three year
investigation of a fire that destroyed the defendant’s home and that led
local authorities to believe that the defendant had committed several
federal crimes related to the suspected arson.108 Six months after federal
officials began to investigate the defendant’s involvement in the arson,
the defendant attacked and threatened a witness because he believed the
witness had given authorities information about his involvement in the
arson.109
In upholding the defendant’s conviction of witness tampering, the
Third Circuit Court of Appeals held that the government need not
establish a federal investigation was pending or about to be instituted
and rejected the government’s contention that it must only prove that the
underlying offense was federal in nature or that the government need
only show that the defendant acted with intent to prevent
communication with law enforcement in general.110 Instead, the court
101 F.3d 909 (3d Cir. 1996).
113 F.3d 1345 (3d Cir. 1997).
107
Harris, 498 F.3d 278; Veal, 153 F.3d 1233; infra note 126 (noting that the Third Circuit
Court of Appeals in recent decisions claims adherence to Stansfield and Bell, but also
appears to enunciate a broader test similar to that set forth by the Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals in Veal).
108
Stansfield, 101 F.3d at 911. The court noted that the investigation began as a local
investigation in order to determine the possible causes of the fire. Id. Once the local
authorities determined that arson could be a possible cause of the fire, they contacted
federal authorities to continue the investigation. Id. Local authorities also transferred the
investigation to federal authorities because of the possibility that the defendant used the
federal mail system to perpetrate a fraud. Id.
109
Id. at 912. The defendant used physical force against the witness’s parents and bound
them in their basement while he prepared himself for the witness to appear. Id. Once the
witness arrived home, the defendant threatened the witness with a loaded shotgun and
asked him why he had spoken to the police about the defendant’s involvement in the
arson. Id. After a struggle, the victims were able to gain control of the shotgun and subdue
the defendant until the police arrived. Id. A grand jury indicted, and a jury later convicted,
the defendant of tampering with a witness under § 1512. Id. The defendant was also
indicted on eleven additional charges which are not relevant to the discussion of § 1512. Id.
110
Id. at 918. In the case, the court specifically explained:
105
106
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held that the government must show that the defendant acted with the
intent to prevent any person’s communication with law enforcement
authorities about an offense that was actually federal in nature, or
“federal-in-fact,” and also that the defendant believed the person might
communicate with federal authorities.111 Thus, according to the Third
Circuit Court of Appeals, the government establishes a sufficient federal
nexus by showing that an offense is federal in nature and proving
“additional appropriate evidence.”112
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals clarified this holding in United
States v. Bell, a case which highlights why § 1512 is needed to protect
witnesses. In Bell, the defendant murdered the informant on the eve of
the day that she was to testify against the defendant; the arrangement,
whereby the informant was scheduled to testify, was made possible
because of a joint federal and state investigation into drug trafficking.113
[w]ere we to require only that the government prove that the
underlying offense is federal and the defendant intended to prevent
the witness from communicating with law enforcement officials in
general, without also proving the defendant’s knowledge of or belief in
the possibility that the witness would communicate with federal
authorities, we would essentially vitiate an important facet of the
intent requirement of the statute.
Id.
Id. The court held that
the government must prove . . . the defendant was motivated by a
desire to prevent the communication between any person and law
enforcement authorities concerning the commission or possible
commission of an offense; . . . that offense was actually a federal
offense; . . . and [] the defendant believed that the person . . . might
communicate with the federal authorities.
Id. The court found that the jury in Stansfield could reasonably infer the defendant
believed Hoffman might communicate with federal authorities because the underlying
offense of mail fraud was federal in nature and federal authorities had already begun to
investigate, despite the defendant’s lack of actual knowledge that federal authorities were
then involved in the investigation. Id. at 919. The initial crime of arson would not have
brought the defendant under the purview of § 1512, but the use of the federal postal system
to perpetrate the insurance fraud did. Id. at 911. The court held that the involvement of
federal Postal Inspectors and the United States Attorney satisfied the requirement for
additional appropriate evidence because the witness communicated with actual federal
authorities and the government did not have to establish that the defendant knew the
officials were federal authorities. Id. at 917 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1512(f) (2006)).
112
Id. at 918. The additional evidence that the court in Stansfield found appropriate was
evidence that, at the time the defendant acted to interfere with the witness’s cooperation
with the law enforcement officials, the investigation had been turned over to federal
officials. Id.
113
United States v. Bell, 113 F.3d 1345, 1348 (3d Cir. 1997). The Tri-County Drug Task
Force (“Task Force”) which consists of local, state and federal investigators operates in
three counties within Pennsylvania. Id. at 1347. The Task Force, prior to the investigation
at issue in Bell, had previously developed federal and state criminal cases. Id. Similar
111
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In upholding the defendant’s conviction of witness tampering under
§ 1512, the court applied Stansfield and clarified that, while a jury may
infer that a federal nexus exists from the fact that the underlying offense
is actually a federal offense, the government must also prove the
defendant believed that the witness might communicate with federal
authorities regarding that offense.114 The government is not required to
prove the defendant’s state of mind with regard to the federal nature of
the authorities, but is required to prove that the defendant believed the
witness would communicate with federal officers.115 In other words, the
investigatory bodies exist in most states because federal and state cooperation is essential
in drug trafficking investigations. Kearney, supra note 2.
In Bell, the informant had provided information in an investigation of drug offenses in
which Bell’s boyfriend was the prime suspect. Bell, 113 F.3d at 1347. After the informant
was scheduled to testify at the resulting trial, defendant and several others kidnapped her,
took her to an isolated location and killed her with the express intent to prevent her from
testifying. Id. After the trial court acquitted the defendant of murder and witness
tampering in a state court, federal authorities began their own investigation which led to
the defendant’s conviction in federal court of murder and witness tampering. Id. Bell’s
boyfriend, David Tyler, was convicted in a separate case. United States v. Tyler, 281 F.3d
84 (3d Cir. 2002). See also United States v. Tyler, 167 N.J.L. 813, Feb. 25, 2002, at 1 (discussing
the underlying facts of the witness tampering charges and both Tyler and Bell’s
involvement).
114
Bell, 113 F.3d at 1349 (3d Cir. 1997) (stating “we do not read [Stansfield] as requiring
proof that the defendant believed the victim might communicate with law enforcement
officers whom the defendant knew or believed to be federal officers.”) (emphasis in original). In
Bell, the court found that, although the Task Force had not begun an investigation
specifically into the defendant’s conduct, the jury could properly infer that the defendant
believed the witness’ cooperation with authorities would result in additional
communication with the authorities regarding the defendant’s illegal drug activity. Id. at
1350. The court found that the victim acted as an informant for the Task Force and that the
defendant acted with the belief that her conduct would prevent the victim’s testifying
regarding a federal drug offense. Id. at 1347, 1350.
115
Id. at 1349 (stating “the statute mandates . . . proof that the officers with whom the
defendant believed the victim might communicate would in fact be federal officers.”). Though
the defendant in Bell may not have known the task force consisted of both local and federal
authorities, the fact that the underlying drug offense was federal in nature was sufficient to
establish a federal nexus because a jury could reasonably infer the defendant wished to
prevent the witness’ communication with a partially federal law enforcement body
regarding possible commission of federal crimes, and that at least one of the
communications would have in fact been with a federal officer. Id. at 1350.
Several other courts have used the phrase “happened to be federal.” See United States
v. Applewhaite, 195 F.3d 679 (3d Circ. 1999) (stating that all that the government must
prove is “that the defendants had the intent to influence an investigation that happened to
be federal.”); United States v. Perry, 335 F.3d 316 (4th Cir. 2003) (quoting Applewhaite, 195
F.3d 679 ) (finding there was sufficient evidence to establish the defendant intended to
“influence an investigation that happened to be federal”). Both the Third Circuit and other
circuits have labeled this test using two different phrases, federal-in-fact test as enunciated
in Stansfield or happens-to-to be federal as enunciated in Bell. See Stansfield, 101 F.3d at 918;
Bell, 113 F.3d at 1349. The two tests seem to be functionally equivalent.
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government must prove that at least one officer with whom a defendant
wishes to prevent witness communication “happened to be” a federal
officer.116
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals later explained its rationale
behind its holdings in Stansfield and Bell in United States v. Applewhaite.117
As noted by the court, Congress’s purpose for enacting § 1512 was to
provide better protection to witnesses and victims of federal crimes and
to protect the integrity of the process; thus, it is consistent with § 1512 to
require only that the government establish the defendant intended to
influence an investigation that happened to be federal.118 The Fifth
Bell, 113 F.3d at 1349 (stating that “the government must prove that at least one of the
law-enforcement-officer communications which the defendant sought to prevent would
have been with a federal officer, but that the government is not obligated to prove that the
defendant knew or intended anything with respect to this federal involvement[]”). See also
Moore, supra note 44, at 843 (stating that § 1512 has been interpreted broadly to include
situations in which the government could prove “at least one of the communications would
have been with a federal officer[]”).
The government can prove that a sufficient federal nexus existed to convict the
defendant under § 1512 if the government establishes that the underlying offense was
federal in nature and provided appropriate additional evidence to prove that the defendant
believed the witness would communicate to federal authorities. Bell, 113 F.3d at 1349
(quoting Stansfield, 101 F.3d at 918). The court in Bell held that the jury could reasonably
infer that the defendant intended to prevent future communications with the Task Force
regarding federal drug crimes because the victim continued to provided information to the
Task Force on drug related offenses in which the defendant was involved. Id. at 1350.
117
195 F.3d 679 (3d Cir. 1999). The court in Applewhaite notes that the fact that the
underlying offense is federal in nature creates a substantial likelihood that federal
authorities will become involved in the investigation or prosecution of such crimes. Id. at
688. The court states that an individual who commits a federal crime’s ignorance of the law
is not relevant to whether the government can establish that she violated a federal statute.
118
Id. at 688. See supra note 28 and accompanying text (discussing S. Rep. No. 97-532,
supra note 3, at 9, and the Congressional intent behind the enactment of § 1512); see also Bell,
113 F.3d at 1350 (holding that the government need only prove that the defendant acted
with the intention to interfere with a federal proceeding and not that the defendant knew
of the federal nature of such proceeding). The specific facts and the court’s ultimate
holding in Applewhaite are a bit of an anomaly within cases brought under § 1512. The
specific facts of the case are unclear on whether the case was correctly in federal court, but
the Third Circuit does speak to the issue. Id. at 688. The court holds that, regardless of
whether a case is in federal court by accident or mistake, the fact that a case is incorrectly
tried in federal court does not render § 1512 inapplicable. Id. The court specifically stated
that:
A federal prosecution remains federal in character for purposes of the
umbrella of § 1512 even if it is in federal court only by accident or
mistake. The issue of whether authorities are correct when they select
a federal forum over a state forum does not alter the federal nature of
the prosecutions brought in federal court insofar as a violation of 18
U.S.C. § 1512 is concerned.
Id. See also Surette, supra note 32 (explaining the facts and holding of the court in
Applewhaite).
116
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Circuit Court of Appeals, in United States v. Causey, and the First Circuit
Court of Appeals in United States v. Rodriguez-Marerro and United States v.
Baldyga, also apply this reasoning.119 However, other circuits, such as the
Fourth and Eleventh Circuits, apply a different analysis that provides
victims greater protection under the VWPA.120
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, in United States v. Veal,
convicted several city police detectives of tampering with witnesses with
the intent to hinder or delay communication of a federal offense to
federal authorities when they acted to mislead state investigators
regarding civil rights violations allegedly committed by the detectives.121
Noting that the legislative intent of the VWPA was to protect the
integrity of federal investigations and proceedings, the court found

United States v. Rodriquez-Marrero, 390 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2004); Baldyga, 233 F.3d 674 ;
United States v. Causey, 185 F.3d 407 (5th Cir. 1999). See also Sarah Roadcap, Obstruction of
Justice, 41 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 911, 932 n.127 (2004) (discussing the holding of Applewhaite and
Causey).
While the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals claims to expressly reject the reasoning of the
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Veal, it also appears to enunciate a test that is broader
than the federal-in-fact test set forth by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals. Causey, 185
F.3d at 422 (stating “we do not read [the statute] as requiring proof that the defendant
believed the victim might communicate with law enforcement officers whom the defendant
knew or believed to be federal officers.”) (quoting Bell, 113 F.3d at 1349) (emphasis added). The
First Circuit also appears to follow the federal-in-fact test but also mentions and discusses
the decision by the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Veal, 153 F.3d 1233.
120
Veal, 153 F.3d 1233; Harris, 498 F.3d 278. Recently, the Third Circuit cited to Veal in
Guadalupe, 402 F.3d at 413. However, the court did not extend the analysis of the Eleventh
Circuit Court of Appeals to the decision in Guadalupe because it held that the government
had proven sufficient additional evidence to satisfy the nexus requirement as set forth in
Stansfield. Guadalupe, 402 F.3d at 413. Also, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Causey,
expressly declined to follow the reasoning of the Eleventh Circuit. Causey, 185 F.3d at 422.
In Veal, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals specifically addressed the federal nexus
requirement of § 1512(b)(3). Veal, 153 F.3d at 1245. The court in Veal found that other
sections of § 1512 implicate different federal interests. Id. at 1250. For example, the federal
interest in §§ 1512(a), (b)(1), and (b)(2) was “the status of the targeted person, potential
witnesses in ‘official proceedings[.]’” Id. at 1250–51 n.24. However, the court did note that
in these sections the “statute expressly states that the proceeding ‘need not be pending or
about to be instituted at the time of the offense.’” Id. However, the federal nexus
requirement of other sections have been analyzed in the same manner. See Diaz, 176 F.3d at
91; and Baldyga, 233 F.3d at 680 n.5 (1st Cir. 2000).
121
Veal, 153 F.3d at 1238. In Veal, undercover police officers attacked a drug dealer they
were investigating after being informed that the drug dealer had contracted to kill one of
the police officers. Id. at 1236. The officers attempted to cover up the incident. Id. The
officers lied to the initial investigators, including the crime-scene technician and Miami
City homicide detectives. Id. at 1237. Three days after the attack, the FBI began a civil
rights investigation into the incident. Id. at 1238. See also James P. Fleissner & Jeffrey R.
Harris, Constitutional Criminal Procedure: A Two Year Survey, 50 MERCER L. REV. 921, 939–41
(1999) (discussing the facts and holding of Veal especially in the context of civil rights
litigation).
119
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sufficient evidence that the information, which was later transferred to
federal authorities, established a federal nexus under the Act.122
Specifically, the court held that the government need only prove the
misleading information was “likely” to be transferred to federal
authorities, not that the officials who initially received the information
were federal officials.123
Recently, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, in United States v.
Harris, chose to follow the broader interpretation as set forth by the
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Veal, requiring only that the
government prove the underlying offense was federal in nature and the
potential existed for the information to be transferred to federal
authorities.124 However, other circuits, including the First and Fifth
Circuits, follow the reasoning set forth by the Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit in Stansfield and Bell, requiring that the government must
Veal, 153 F.3d at 1247. The court also concluded that state investigators can,
themselves, be considered witnesses under the plain language of § 1512. Id. Congressional
intent behind enacting the act indicates that the Act encompassed law enforcement officials
as witness. Id. Also, the Court noted that “the federal interest derives from the character of
the affected activity, [i.e.,] the transmission of information to federal law enforcement agents
and/or a federal judge concerning a possible federal crime.”) Id. at 1251 (emphasis in
original). The Court went a step farther and stated that the nexus requirement as set forth
in Aguilar was not controlling because § 1512 protected broader federal interests that § 1503
was not meant to address. Id. See also Dana E. Hill, Anticipatory Obstruction of Justice: Preemptive Document Destruction under the Sarbanes-Oxley Anti-Shredding Statute, 18 U.S.C. §
1519, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 1519, 1531 n.65 (noting Veal’s distinguishing the nexus
requirements under §§ 1503, 1505, & 1512); O’Sullivan, supra note 45, at 692–93 n.204
(noting the determination of the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals that the nexus
requirement as set forth in Aguilar was not controlling).
123
Veal, 153 F.3d at 1251. The court found that “the federal interest derives from the
character of the affected activity, the transmission of information to federal law enforcement
agents and/or a federal judge concerning a possible federal crime.” Id. (emphasis in
original). Therefore, all the government had to prove was “the possibility or likelihood that
. . . information would be transferred to federal authorities irrespective of the governmental
authority represented by the initial investigators.” Id. at 1251–52 (emphasis in original).
The court in Veal relied on Stansfield and its progeny in elucidating this holding. Id. at 1251
n.26 (quoting Stansfield, 101 F.3d 909). Specifically, the Veal court found that Stansfield
stated that the possibility that a person “might communicate with the federal authorities”
was sufficient to find a federal nexus. Id. (emphasis in original).
124
Harris, 498 F.3d at 286 (holding that “[s]o long as the information the defendant seeks
to suppress actually relates to the commission or possible commission of a federal offense,
the federal nexus requirement is established.”); Guadalupe, 402 F.3d at 413 (discussing the
interpretation of the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals of the federal nexus requirement,
but finding sufficient additional evidence to convict applying the rational of Stansfield and
Bell); Perry, 335 F.3d at321 n.7 (deciding not to apply the rationale of Veal in finding a
sufficient showing of intent to interfere with an investigation which “‘happened to be
federal’[]”); Applewhaite, 195 F.3d at 687 (discussing that a defendant could be convicted
with witness tampering with a showing that the investigation “turns out to be federal[]”
and the underlying offense is a federal crime).
122
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prove additional evidence beyond the mere fact that the underlying
offense was federal in nature in order to establish a sufficient federal
nexus to prosecute under the VWPA.125 Several decisions by the Third
Circuit Court of Appeals, such as United States v. Applewhaite and United
States v. Guadalupe, confirm the current tension in this area of the law.126
III. ANALYSIS: THE CURRENT CONFUSION REGARDING THE APPLICATION OF
THE FEDERAL NEXUS REQUIREMENT UNDER 18 U.S.C. § 1512
While the Supreme Court has addressed the issue of whether a
federal nexus must be established to prosecute a defendant under § 1512
of the VWPA, courts disagree as to what evidence sufficiently supports
the establishment of a federal nexus.127 The Third Circuit Court of
Appeals established a standard in its early interpretation of the federal
nexus requirement which many courts followed in convicting
defendants under § 1512.128 Following these decisions, the Eleventh
Circuit Court of Appeals interpreted the statute broadly to extend the

125
Rodriquez-Marrero, 390 F.3d at 13 (citing Bell, 113 F.3d at 1350) (finding proof that
federal authorities had already begun a federal investigation prior to the defendant’s act to
tamper with a witness constitutes “appropriate additional evidence” under Stansfield and
Bell); Perry, 335 F.3d at 321 (finding sufficient additional evidence that the defendant
intended to influence an investigation that happened to be federal); Causey, 185 F.3d at 422
(expressly rejecting the reasoning of Veal in holding that the government must prove the
defendant acted with the intention to interfere with a federal investigation); Baldyga, 233
F.3d at 680 (holding that in joint investigations the possibility exists that communications
will eventually occur with federal authorities).
126
Guadalupe, 402 F.3d at 413. The court in Guadalupe discussed both Stansfield and Veal.
Id. While the court held that the government may establish a sufficient federal nexus by
showing that the investigation later became federal, it also stated it “stay[ed] faithful to the
teachings of Stansfield and Bell because there [was] ‘additional appropriate evidence’ . . . .”
which established the federal nexus. Id. See also Applewhaite, 195 F.3d 679 (convicting the
defendant using the rationale of Stansfield and Bell but elucidating a broader “turns out to
be federal” analysis in dicta). The court in Applewhaite used such broad language as “turns
out to be federal” in stating the required federal nexus under § 1512. Id. at 687.
127
See supra Parts II.C.1 & II.C.4. As a starting point in determining the minimum federal
connection required to be prosecuted under § 1512, courts look to the United States
Supreme Court’s analysis on § 1503 decision in Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593. See supra Part II.C.2
(discussing the Supreme Court’s holding in Aguilar). But see supra note 122 and
accompanying text (discussing why the Eleventh Circuit does not find the nexus
requirement as set forth in Aguilar controlling in prosecutions brought § 1512 ).
128
See supra Part II.C.4. The Court in Arthur Andersen established that some nexus must
be establish in order to convict a defendant under § 1512. Arthur Andersen LLP, 544 U.S. at
708. See also supra note 73 and accompanying text (noting the Court’s holding in Arthur
Andersen). However, prior to the decision in Arthur Andersen, the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals established a test to establish the requisite federal nexus under § 1512. See supra
notes 106-116 and accompanying text (explaining the holdings of the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals in Stansfield, 101 F.3d 909 and Bell, 113 F.3d 1345).
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reach of § 1512.129 Recently, the Third Circuit has used both its earlier
decisions and the interpretation by the Eleventh Circuit when applying
the federal nexus requirement to prosecutions under § 1512.130 Finally,
to add to the lack of uniformity among the circuits regarding the
interpretation of the federal nexus requirement, the Fourth Circuit Court
of Appeals recently distinguished its earlier decisions relying on the
interpretation of the Third Circuit Court Appeals to enunciate a test
which expanded the reach of § 1512.131
Part III.A first discusses the problems associated with the initial test
set forth by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in its early cases.132 While
several decisions have attempted to apply the language of Stansfield and
Bell, no court, including the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, has applied
the test with much consistency.133 Next, Part III.B will discuss the
problems associated with the application of the Veal test.134
A. The Practical Inapplicability of the Third Circuit’s Test
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals attempted to set forth a test to
establish the jurisdictional requirement under § 1512 of the VWPA by
enunciating its federal-in-fact test.135 In Stansfield and Bell, the Third
Circuit Court of Appeals in effect limited the reach of § 1512 to only
cases that actually involved a full-blown federal investigation.136
However, by limiting the jurisdiction of the Act to only those cases,
many victims of federal crimes which the VWPA is meant to protect are
left unprotected.137 Most victims and witnesses do not initially report
crimes to federal officials.138
Veal, 153 F.3d 1233.
The Fifth Circuit expressly rejects the Third Circuit’s
interpretation of § 1512’s nexus requirement and continues to apply the more limited
interpretation used by the Third Circuit in its earlier cases. See Causey, 185 F.3d 407.
130
See supra note 126 and accompanying text (noting that the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals in recent decisions claims adherence to Stansfield and Bell, but also appears to
enunciate a broader test similar to that set forth by the Eleventh Circuit of Appeals in Veal).
131
Harris, 498 F.3d 278.
132
Infra Part III.A.
133
See infra note 117 (discussing the Third Circuit’s application of Stansfield and Bell in
Applewhaite, 195 F.3d 679; notes 118–19 and accompanying text (discussing the application
by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals of the test set forth in Stansfield and Bell).
134
Infra Part IV.A.
135
See supra Part II.D. As noted before, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals called its test
the federal-in-fact test in Stansfield and then the happens-to-be-federal test in Bell. See supra
note 115 and accompanying text. For all purposes, the two tests appear to be applied the
same.
136
See supra notes 106–16 and accompanying text (discussing the Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit’s enunciation of its federal-in-fact test in Stansfield and Bell).
137
See supra Part II.A (discussing that Congressional intent behind the enactment of
§ 1512 was to extend protection to a broader range of persons and safeguard the integrity
129
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The federal-in-fact test does not extend protection to victims and
witnesses who are attacked prior to federal officials becoming involved
in investigations of federal crimes.139 The fact that federal officials
become involved at a later date regarding the same investigation does
not qualify as “additional appropriate evidence” under the test as
interpreted by the circuits that follow it.140 Thus, a witness may not be
protected if the government shows only that the offense was federal in
nature and that federal officials were later involved.141
However, the federal-in-fact test seems to completely overlook that
the federal nature of a crime creates a substantial likelihood that federal
agents will eventually investigate the crime.142 Also, the defendant’s
subjective state of mind of whether he is violating a substantive federal
law bears no relationship to whether the government can establish that
the defendant’s conduct did violate substantive federal law.143 Thus, a
defendant should not be allowed to declare ignorance of the law in
claiming that he only intended to interfere with communications with
local or state authorities. The federal nature of the crime, while not
dispositive,144 should be given great weight even when the investigation
does not initially begin with federal officials. Though the issue in
Applewhaite involved officials choosing the wrong forum for the case, the
analysis should be extended to witnesses.145 Simply because a witness
may choose the wrong “forum” in which to report a crime, she should
of the criminal justice system). See also notes 29–30 and accompanying text (discussing the
purpose behind the enactment of § 1512); note 118 and accompanying text (discussing one
purpose behind the enactment of § 1512 was to safeguard the integrity of the judicial
system).
138
See supra note 29 and accompanying text (noting that most crimes fall under the
jurisdiction of state and local agencies).
139
See supra notes 106–16 and accompanying text (setting forth the federal-in-fact test of
the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit). Under the reasoning of the Third Circuit in
Stansfield and Bell and the reasoning of the Fifth Circuit in Causey, the official the witness is
communicating with or might communicate with must in fact be a federal official at the
time the witness is attempting to communicate. See Stansfield, 101 F.3d 909; Bell, 113 F.3d
1345; Causey, 185 F.3d 407.
140
See Stansfield, 101 F.3d 909; Bell, 113 F.3d 1345.
141
Stansfield, 101 F.3d at 918. See also supra notes 106–12 and accompanying text
(discussing the facts and reasoning underlying the court’s decision in Stansfield).
142
See supra note 117 and accompanying text (discussing the reasoning of the Third
Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. Applewhaite).
143
Applewhaite, 195 F.3d at 687. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
144
See supra notes 108–16 and accompanying text (discussing the holdings of the Third
Circuit Court of Appeals in Stansfield and Bell—that the government must prove more than
the fact that the underlying offense is federal in nature).
145
See supra note 118 and accompanying text (discussing the court’s finding that a federal
prosecution remains federal in nature regardless of whether it is in federal court by
mistake). See also Applewhaite, 195 F.3d at 688.
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not be precluded from protection under a federal statute meant to
provide protection to her. This result is entirely appositive to Congress’s
intent in enacting the VWPA to protect victims of federal crimes.146
Two Circuits appear to apply the rationale of Stansfield and Bell
when deciding whether a sufficient federal nexus exists to convict a
defendant under § 1512.147 However, both the First and Fifth Circuits
distort the test. The First Circuit appears to apply the Third Circuit’s
federal-in-fact test and also adds the decision of the Eleventh Circuit
Court of Appeals in Veal to the discussion, whereas the Fifth Circuit has
clearly refused to follow the decision in Veal and does not appear to
adhere to the test set forth by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in
Bell.148 In contradiction to the holding in Bell, the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals held that the defendant’s knowledge or belief that the
authorities were federal officials is irrelevant.149
Also, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in recent cases has lessened
the burden on the government in establishing a sufficient federal nexus,
in contradiction to its earlier decision.150 In light of these cases, the Third
Circuit Court of Appeals appears to be interpreting § 1512 differently
than it did initially.151 In fact, the court stated that the government may
establish a sufficient federal nexus by simply showing that a defendant
intended to interfere with a communication that was likely to be
transferred to federal authorities, regardless of whether the investigation
started at the local level.152 This holding is not entirely consistent with
the earlier holdings of the Third Circuit.153 Thus, circuit courts have not
146
See supra notes 29–30 and accompanying text (discussing congressional enactment of
§ 1512 of the VWPA).
147
See supra note 119 and accompanying text. See also United States v. RodriquezMarrero, 390 F.3d 1, 13 (1st Cir. 2004); United States v. Baldyga, 233 F.3d 674 (1st Cir. 2000);
Causey, 185 F.3d 407 (5th Cir. 1999).
148
See supra note 119 accompanying text (noting the discrepancy in the decision by the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals). See also Causey, 185 F.3d at 422. The Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals cites directly to the decision of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in Bell. Id. at
422.
149
See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
150
Guadalupe, 402 F.3d 409. See supra note 126 and accompanying text. The court itself
stated that its decision in Applewhaite was more closely in line with the Eleventh Circuit’s
decision than with the Third Circuit’s earlier decisions. Guadalupe, 402 F.3d at 413.
151
See supra note 126 and accompanying text (discussing the decisions of the Third
Circuit Court of Appeals in Guadalupe and Applewhaite).
152
Guadalupe, 402 F.3d at 413. The exact language used by the court is:
All that was required [to show a violation of § 1512] was the possibility or
likelihood that [the defendants’] false and misleading information would be
transferred to federal authorities irrespective of the governmental authority
represented by the initial investigators.
Id. (quoting Veal, 153 F.3d at1251–52 ) (emphasis in original).
153
See supra Part II.D. The Third Circuit stated in Stansfield:
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consistently applied the same standard in determining what constitutes a
sufficient federal nexus under § 1512.
The lack of clarity, which exists within the Third Circuit and the
circuits which purport to apply its earlier jurisprudence, makes it unclear
exactly what the government must show to establish a sufficient federal
nexus to satisfy the jurisdictional element of § 1512 in that jurisdiction.154
Even though § 1512 has been found to not violate the Fifth Amendment
due process rights of a defendant, this schizophrenic application of the
statute does not provide defendant’s with adequate notice of what types
of possible investigations would be protected under § 1512.155
Furthermore, the original interpretation of § 1512 by the Third
Circuit, which has been followed by the First and Fifth Circuits, appears
too restrictive in requiring that the officer with whom the witness wishes
to communicate be a federal officer. This requirement does not truly
comport with the purpose of § 1512. The congressional intent for the
enactment of § 1512 of the VWPA appears to encompass investigations
that may include local authorities investigating federal crimes in
cooperation with federal officials.156 Some of the case law within the
First, Third, and Fifth Circuits does not appear to take this intent into
consideration and has limited the jurisdiction of § 1512 too severely.
Were we to require only that the government prove that the
underlying offense is federal and that the defendant intended to
prevent the witness from communicating with law enforcement
officials in general, without also proving the defendant’s knowledge of
or belief in the possibility that the witness would communicate with
federal authorities, we would essentially vitiate an important facet of
the intent requirement of the statute.
United States v. Stansfield, 101 F.3d 909, 918 (3d Cir. 1996) (emphasis in original). See also
supra notes 106-116 and accompanying text (discussing the earlier decisions of the Third
Circuit in Stansfield and Bell).
154
See supra notes 106–19 and accompanying text. In Stansfield, an investigation which
began locally, became protected under § 1512 six months after the investigation began. See
supra notes 108–09 and accompanying text (discussing the facts underlying the Third
Circuit’s decision in Stansfield). In Bell, a joint task force which had regularly consisted of
both local and federal authorities provided a sufficient federal connection as to bring the
investigation and any witnesses involved under the protection of § 1512. See supra notes
113–16 and accompanying text (discussing United States v. Bell, 113 F.3d 1345 (3d Cir.
1997). However, in Applewhaite, the court held that a case in federal court by accident or
mistake would still be protected under § 1512. See supra notes 117–18 and accompanying
text (discussing United States v. Applewhaite, 195 F.3d 679 (3d Cir. 1999)).
155
See supra notes 32–34 and accompanying text (discussing the constitutionality of §
1512). The fact that a defendant cannot predict what conduct would be proscribed
implicates due process concerns.
156
See supra notes 29–30 and accompanying text (discussing congressional intent to
provide broad protection to victims and witnesses of federal crimes). See also supra note 122
and accompanying text (noting the discussion of the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals of
the congressional intent behind § 1512).
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However, the broader interpretation of the statute enunciated by the
Fourth and Eleventh Circuits also presents problems.
B. The Problems Associated With Veal and Harris
The rationale of the Fourth and Eleventh Circuits also presents
problems because most serious crimes fall under the jurisdiction of the
states.157 As stated by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, the purpose
for congressional enactment of § 1512 was to provide protection to
victims and witnesses of federal crimes while ensuring the integrity of
criminal investigations and proceedings.158 However, courts that apply a
more stringent test upon the government to establish a close relationship
between the defendant’s interference with a witness and a federal
investigation or proceeding argue that a lesser standard would infringe
upon the jurisdiction of the states.159 On the other hand, those that apply
a lesser standard argue that, on many occasions, state and federal
investigators corroborate when investigating criminal conduct that
constitutes a federal crime.160
The analysis of the federal nexus requirement should be conducted
in a functional manner so as to cover all conduct which functions to
tamper with witnesses “in order to frustrate the ends of justice[,]”161 but
also in a way that does not infringe upon the jurisdiction of the states.
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals asserts that in order to fulfill the
objectives of § 1512 and to protect the integrity of the potential federal
investigation, prosecutions must be allowed when witness tampering
affects the transfer of information regarding a commission or possible
commission of a federal crime from state and local authorities to federal
law enforcement.162 However, the method used by both the Fourth and
Eleventh Circuits presents the possibility that the federal courts may
157
S. Rep. No. 97-532, supra note 3, at 10 (noting that “the majority of serious violent
crimes fall within the jurisdiction of the state and local law enforcement agencies.”). See
also supra notes 29–30 and accompanying text.
158
United States v. Applewhaite, 195 F.3d 679 (3d Cir. 1999).
159
See United States v. Causey, 185 F.3d 407 (5th Cir. 1999.
160
See Harris, 498 F.3d 278. See also Kearney, supra note 2.
161
United States v. Veal, 153 F.3d 1233, 1247 (11th Cir. 1998).
162
Harris, 498 F.3d at 285 (quoting Perry, 335 F.3d at 321) (stating that “‘the federal
interest of protecting the integrity of potential federal investigations by ensuring that
transfers of information to federal law enforcement . . . relating to the possible commission
of federal offenses be truthful and unimpeded.’”). This rationale is also supported by the
United States Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593 (1995)
(stating in dicta that the fact that the witness may never have communicated the
information to any authority is irrelevant in determining that the defendant intended to
prevent the witness from doing so). See supra Part II.C.2 and accompanying text
(discussing the Court’s rationale and Justice Scalia’s dissent).
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intrude upon the jurisdiction of state agencies and courts.163 Both sides
of the debate claim to be interpreting the plain language of the statute.
The differing interpretations indicate that Congress should speak again
and amend the statute to provide clear and concise guidelines as to what
satisfies the jurisdictional element of § 1512.
Jurisdictions that limit the reach of the statute run the risk of leaving
out ancillary investigations that are integral to the integrity of the federal
criminal system. However, jurisdictions that interpret the federal nexus
requirement broadly run the risk of overstepping state and local
jurisdictions.164 However, Congress should amend the statute to provide
clear guidance to courts of its intent—specifically, which proceedings or
investigations would fall under the protection of § 1512 of the VWPA.165
IV. PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO 18 U.S.C. § 1512
Congress should amend 18 U.S.C. § 1512 because current law is
unclear as to which victims and witnesses would qualify for protection
under the Act.166 A victim should not be precluded from the protection
of the Act simply for reporting the crime to the wrong authorities. If
state or local authorities eventually contact federal authorities regarding
information received in an initial investigation, the victim or witness
should be protected under the VWPA.167
Consequently, this Note proposes that § 1512 of the VWPA be
amended by adding language to the substantive sections of the statute
and by adding an additional subsection to the Act to clarify the federal
nexus requirement. These additions will help the current statute better
comport with the original congressional intent behind the statute and

163
S. Rep. No. 97-532, supra note 3. See also supra note 9 and accompanying text
(discussing the purpose behind the enactment of § 1512 and recognizing the jurisdiction of
state and local systems over most serious violent crimes).
164
See supra Part II.D (discussing differing constructions of § 1512). Justice Scalia’s
dissent in Aguilar supports the position that the obstruction statutes should be read broadly
to provide protection to all victims and witnesses of federal crimes. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593
(Scalia J., dissenting). Also, some of the language of the majority’s decision seems to
indicate a disposition to read the jurisdictional elements of the obstruction acts broadly. Id.
165
See infra Part IV.
166
See supra Part III (discussing the problems associated with the current state of the law
regarding the interpretation of the federal nexus requirement of § 1512).
167
See supra notes 120–23 and accompanying text (discussing Veal and its reasoning to
interpret § 1512 broadly to provide protection to victims whose communications with local
authorities are transferred to federal authorities).
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provide protection to all persons who deserve protection under the Act
via amendments and adding a new section.168
First, the Act should be amended to allow protection to victims and
witnesses whose communication with local or state authorities is
transferred to federal officials to be used in a federal investigation or
proceeding. Second, the Act should be amended to set forth relevant
factors in determining whether an investigation constitutes a federal
investigation as to bring cooperating witnesses or victims under the
protection of the Act. Thus, the statute should be amended to read:
(a)(1) Whoever kills or attempts to kill another person,
with intent to . . .
(c) prevent the communication or transmission of
the communication by any person to a law
enforcement officer or judge of the United States
of information relating to the commission or
possible commission of a Federal offense or a
violation of conditions of probation, parole, or
release pending judicial proceedings;
(2) Whoever uses physical force or the threat of
physical force against any person, or attempts to do
so, with intent to— . . .
(c) hinder, delay, or prevent the communication
or transmission of the communication to a law
enforcement officer or judge of the United States
of information relating to the commission or
possible commission of a Federal offense or a
violation of conditions of probation, supervised
release, parole, or release pending judicial
proceedings; shall be punished as provided in
paragraph (3) . . .
(b) Whoever knowingly uses intimidation, threatens, or
corruptly persuades another person, or attempts to do
so, or engages in misleading conduct toward another
person, with intent to— . . .
(3) hinder, delay, or prevent the communication or
transmission of the communication to a law enforcement
officer or judge of the United States of information
relating to the commission or possible commission of
168
See supra note 40 and accompanying text (citing the current version of § 1512). See also
notes 28–30 and accompanying text (discussing the legislative intent behind enactment of
§ 1512 of the VWPA).
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a Federal offense or a violation of conditions of
probation, supervised release, parole, or release
pending judicial proceedings;
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more
than ten years, or both . . .
(c) Whoever corruptly—
(1) alters, destroys, mutilates, or conceals a record,
document, or other object, or attempts to do so, with
the intent to impair the object’s integrity or
availability for use in an official proceeding; or
(2) otherwise obstructs, influences, or impedes any
official proceeding, or attempts to do so,
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned . . . .
(d) Whoever intentionally harasses another person and
thereby hinders, delays, prevents, or dissuades any
person from—. . .
(3) reporting to a law enforcement officer or judge of
the United States the commission or possible
commission of a Federal offense or a violation of
conditions of probation supervised release, parole, or
release pending judicial proceedings; . . .
or attempts to do so, shall be fined under this title or
imprisoned not more than a year, or both.169
Commentary
First, several courts already recognize that, in reality, investigations
of the commission or possible commission of a federal crime do not exist
in a vacuum where victims and witnesses report the crime directly to
federal officials.170 Most crimes are reported directly to local and state
officials who then determine whether federal involvement is
necessary.171 The information communicated to local and state officials

169
This proposal is the contribution of the author. The proposed additions are italicized
and the language in regular font is taken directly from § 1512. See generally 18 U.S.C.
§ 1512. For purposes of this amendment, transmission shall be defined according to the
common legal usage. Black’s Law Dictionary defines transmit as “1. To send or transfer (a
thing) from one person or place to another. 2. To communicate.” BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 1537 (8th ed. 2004).
170
See supra note 2 and accompanying text (noting, after the holding of the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals in Harris that federal and local officials recognize the need to cooperate,
especially in the area of drug crimes).
171
See supra note 29 and accompanying text (discussing federal recognition that most
violent crimes are investigated and prosecuted by state officials).
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is then transferred to federal officials once they become involved in the
investigation or completely take control.172 Victims and witnesses cannot
be expected to determine that a crime is federal in deciding to whom
they will report a crime. This does not comport with any rational
understanding of how the criminal justice system works.
The proposed amendment recognizes this reality by expressly
providing protection under § 1512 to individuals who assist in any
federal investigation regardless of when and with whom they first
initially communicated. The amendment does not broaden protection
beyond that which was originally intended by Congress in 1982, but
assures that individuals who fall within the meaning of the statute are
provided the protection intended by Congress. The added language also
comports with the legislative intent to provide broad protection to
individuals who unfortunately become victims or witnesses of federal
crimes.173
Second, one stated purpose of the VWPA is to protect the integrity of
the criminal justice system.174 Local and state officials must be able to
rely on their federal counterparts in order to adequately investigate and
prosecute crimes.175 In turn, victims and witnesses must be able to trust
the system to provide them with justice and protection. The proposed
amendment better fulfills this purpose of the Act by expressly
recognizing that information that is integral to a federal investigation or
prosecution may not be communicated directly to federal authorities, but
to local or state authorities who work in conjunction with federal
authorities.
Finally, the proposed amendment stays true to other language used
within § 1512 and language used by several courts interpreting the Act
more narrowly.176 The Act itself states that a proceeding need not be
pending in order for the victim or witness to be protected.177 The
proposed amendment extends this rational to investigations by
providing protection to individuals against possible conduct that
172
See supra notes 120–23 and accompanying text (relating the facts of Veal and the
rationale of the Eleventh Circuit as finding a sufficient federal nexus to prosecute the
defendant for witness intimidation).
173
See supra notes 28-30 and accompanying text (discussing that Congress intended to
broaden protection of victims and witnesses and to protect the integrity of the judicial
system). See also supra note 123 and accompanying text (discussing the reasoning of the
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. Veal, 153 F.3d 1233 (11th Cir. 1998)).
174
See supra notes 120-23 and accompanying text (discussing Veal).
175
See supra note 2 and accompanying text (referring to one official’s reaction to the
decision in Harris).
176
See supra notes 106–16 and accompanying text (discussing Stansfield and Bell).
177
18 U.S.C. § 1512(f). See also supra note 42 and accompanying text (discussing
subsection 1512(g)).
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occurred before the investigation is turned over to federal authorities.178
Also, early cases decided by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals
enunciated the rule that a sufficient federal nexus could be established
by showing that the underlying offense was federal in nature while also
showing proof of additional appropriate evidence.179 The fact that
information collected in a local or state investigation is turned over to
federal investigators to continue the investigation or prosecution should
be sufficient to establish additional appropriate evidence to satisfy the
nexus requirement of the Act. In addition, the proposed amendment
will provide for greater uniformity in the application of § 1512.180
In addition to the above proposed amendment, a new subsection
should be added to § 1512 regarding factors to be considered when
determining whether a victim or witness shall receive protection under
the Act. The following should also be added to the Section:
(f) For the purposes of this section-(1) an official proceeding need not be pending or
about to be instituted at the time of the offense;
(2) an investigation regarding the commission or
possible commission of a federal falls under the purview
of this section if:
(a) the underlying offense is in fact a federal crime
as proscribed by the United States Code; and
(b) additional factors exist to establish prosecution
under this section. Such additional factors to be
considered include, but are not limited to:
(i) the underlying offense is one which both
local and federal authorities commonly conduct
joint investigations;
(ii) federal officials have frequently been
contacted by local authorities to assist in
investigations regarding similar conduct;
(iii) the underlying investigation resulting in the
possible violation of this section did, in fact,
result in a federal investigation, whether jointly
with local or state officials or solely conducted by
federal officials;

178
This protection is in the form of any deterrent effect the threat of possible federal
prosecution for witness intimidation may have on a defendant.
179
See supra notes 106–16 and accompanying text (discussing the tests set forth by the
Third Circuit Court of Appeals in Stansfield and Bell).
180
See supra Part II.D (discussing the lack of uniformity among the circuits).
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(iv) the defendant was subsequently charged
with a federal crime; and
(v) the underlying offense the defendant was
subsequently convicted of was in fact a federal
crime.
(vi) the testimony, or the record, or other object
need not be admissible in evidence or free of a
claim of privilege.
(3) the testimony, or the record, document, or other
object need not be admissible in evidence or free of a
claim or privilege.181
Commentary
The proposed amendment to the Act extends the protection of § 1512
to possible investigations. The balancing test, which takes into account
the totality of the circumstances surrounding the underlying crime and
the alleged witness tampering, protects against federal encroachment on
state issues.182 The factors listed assure that a sufficient federal nexus
exists before federal authorities can prosecute defendants under the Act,
thus assuaging concerns that the proposed amendment is overbroad.183
Victims and witnesses of federal crimes who initially report crimes to
local or state officials will only qualify for protection if, and when, the
investigation or prosecution is transferred to federal officials. Victims
and witnesses should not be expected or required to know which crimes
constitute a federal crime. This lack of knowledge should not preclude
the victim or witness from protection under the VWPA.
This proposed amendment also restricts the scope of the
aforementioned amendment which some may claim extends beyond the
reach of federal authorities into the realm of exclusive state authority.184
Federal prosecutors and judges are limited by the proposed test to
situations where a clear federal interest is present. Thus, the proposed
amendment alleviates concerns that federal authorities will be able to

181
This proposal is the contribution of the author. The proposed additions are italicized
and the language in regular font is taken directly from § 1512. See generally 18 U.S.C.
§ 1512.
182
See supra notes 30–31 and accompanying text (noting congressional federalism
concerns regarding the enactment of the VWPA).
183
See supra note 3 and accompanying text (citing cases which discuss the
constitutionality of § 1512 of the VWPA).
184
See supra notes 30–31 and accompanying text.
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encroach upon states’ rights.
This amendment also cures any
overbreadth or due process concerns.185
Finally, this proposed amendment will better ensure uniformity
across the several federal jurisdictions by setting forth the specific factors
to be considered under the Act. The proposal provides guidance to
federal officials, especially federal judges regarding whether specific
conduct is proscribed under § 1512.
Ultimately, both proposed amendments work together to provide
victims and witnesses with adequate protection while ensuring that the
purpose of the statute is met. Also, the proposed amendments limit the
reach of the Act to situations where a federal nexus is indeed established.
The proposed amendments will also allow for uniformity and certainty
within the federal jurisdictions because they provide needed guidance to
state and federal courts regarding the protection of victims and
witnesses in joint investigations.
V. CONCLUSION
Returning to Mark, the unfortunate witness to a federal crime who
was subsequently attacked in order to prevent his cooperation with
authorities,186 had Congress made the jurisdictional aspect of § 1512
more clear at the outset, individuals like Mark would not be
experiencing such disparate treatment depending upon which federal
circuit in which they reside or in which circuit the crime occurs. Based
on the facts as described, Mark would be protected in both jurisdictions
because the proposed amendments close the gap which exists in the
current statute. Also, amending § 1512 would result in better protection
to all persons that the original Act intended to protect. Finally, the
proposed amendments would foster cooperation among state and
federal authorities in resolving concurrent and joint investigations.
In sum, current law fails to adequately protect individuals when
they initially report federal crimes to local authorities. The legislative
history underlying the enactment of the VWPA indicates that Congress
intended to provide broader protection to victims and witnesses of
federal crimes than was provided for under previous obstruction of

See supra notes 31–33 and accompanying text (discussing the constitutionality of
§ 1512).
186
See supra Part I.
185

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2009

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 43, No. 2 [2009], Art. 8

814

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43

justice statutes. However, courts have struggled in defining the exact
scope of this protection and many victims and witnesses are still left
unprotected under the Act.
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